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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Young women and men are among the world’s greatest assets. They bring energy, talent and 
creativity to economies and create the foundations for future development. But today’s youth also 
represent a group with serious vulnerabilities in the world of work. In recent years slowing global 
employment growth and increasing unemployment, underemployment and disillusionment have hit young 
people the hardest. As a result, today’s youth are faced with a growing deficit of decent work 
opportunities and high levels of economic and social uncertainty. 
This report adds to growing evidence of a global situation in which young people face increasing 
difficulties when entering the labour force. One of the principal findings of the report is that a global 
deficit of decent work opportunities has resulted in a situation in which one out of three youth in the world 
is either seeking but unable to find work (the unemployed), has given up on the job search entirely (the 
discouraged) or is working but still living below the US$2 a day poverty line (the working poor). This 
second version of the GET Youth (see also GET Youth 2004) updates the key world and regional youth 
labour market indicators, but offers original research as well, including a careful estimation of the number 
and share of youth who work but are living in households of less than US$1 or 2 a day (the so-called youth 
working poor). The working poor youth estimate can serve as a proxy for income-related 
underemployment and therefore fits nicely within the framework presented in the report for identifying 
youth who are most at risk to suffering from degrees of exclusion from decent work and therefore a 
framework for identifying whom would benefit most from targeted interventions. 
Without the right foothold from which to start out right in the labour market, young people are less able to 
make choices that will improve their own job prospects and those of their future dependents. This, in turn, 
perpetuates the cycle of insufficient education, low-productivity employment and working poverty from 
one generation to the next. The report, therefore, adds urgency to the UN call for development of 
strategies aimed to give young people a chance to make the most of their productive potential through 
decent employment. 
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Foreword 
The world is facing a growing youth employment crisis. Both developing and developed 
economies are faced with the challenge of creating decent and sustainable jobs for the large cohort of 
young women and men entering the labour market every year. The issue features prominently on the 
international development agenda. Youth employment is a major focus of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and was reaffirmed by the Ministers and Heads of Delegations 
participating in the High-Level Segment of the Substantive 2006 Session of the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) who committed themselves to “develop[ing] and implement[ing] strategies that 
give youth everywhere a real and equal opportunity to find full and productive employment and decent 
work”.1  
Recognizing that a failure to successfully integrate young people into the labour market has 
broader consequences for the future prosperity and development of countries, in June 2005 ILO 
constituents adopted a resolution on youth employment which spelled out an “ILO plan of action to 
promote pathways to decent work”.2 One element is to expand knowledge of the nature and 
dimensions of youth employment, unemployment and underemployment. The ILO Global 
Employment Trends for Youth aims to do just that.  
This report adds to growing evidence of a global situation in which young people face 
increasing difficulties when entering the labour force. One of the principal findings is that a global 
deficit of decent work opportunities has resulted in a situation in which one out of every three youth in 
the world is either seeking but unable to find work, has given up the job search entirely or is working 
but still living below the US$2 a day poverty line. Without the right foothold from which to start out 
right in the labour market, young people are less able to make choices that will improve their own job 
prospects and those of their future dependents. This, in turn, perpetuates the cycle of insufficient 
education, low-productivity employment and working poverty from one generation to the next. The 
report, therefore, adds urgency to the UN call for development of strategies aimed to give young 
people a chance to make the most of their productive potential through decent employment.  
This report provides empirical research as well as quantitative assessments of the realities of 
youth labour markets to build an analytical starting block from which countries can identify the main 
challenges facing youth for the process of designing the policies most suited to their particular 
situations. At the same time, the data and analyses in the Global Employment Trends for Youth will 
strengthen the capacity of the ILO’s programme on youth employment to provide assistance to 
countries in developing coherent and coordinated interventions on youth employment that are based 
on analytical reviews of labour market information.  
For further expansion of the youth employment knowledge base, the need is not one of 
developing new indicators, but rather finding a way to make use of the indicators that already exist 
(labour force participation rates, employment ratios, unemployment rates, employment by status and 
by sector, long-term unemployment, underemployment, hours of work and poverty). The challenge, 
however, is that, as of now, many of the labour market indicators listed here cannot be applied to 
youth because most countries do not provide the data disaggregated by age. The ILO is intensifying its 
efforts to gather the data by age groups. This will help to improve the accuracy and reliability of 
labour market analyses within a life-cycle perspective.   
                                                 
1
 ECOSOC High-level Segment: Ministerial Declaration, 5 July 2006, E/2006/L.8.  
2
 ILO: “Conclusions on promoting pathways for decent work for youth”, paragraph 5, ILC, 93rd Session (Geneva, 2005); 
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc93/pdf/resolutions.pdf.  
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1. Overview 
 
Young women and men are among the world’s greatest assets. They bring energy, talent and 
creativity to economies and create the foundations for future development. But today’s youth also 
represent a group with serious vulnerabilities in the world of work. In recent years slowing global 
employment growth3 and increasing unemployment, underemployment and disillusionment have hit 
young people the hardest. As a result, today’s youth are faced with a growing deficit of decent work 
opportunities and high levels of economic and social uncertainty. 
The UN Secretary General recently called upon Heads of States to work to put an end to the 
vicious circle of youth unemployment, noting that youth are our most valuable asset, our future.4 The 
sentiment was further advanced by the Ministers and Heads of Delegations participating in the High-
Level Segment of the 2006 Substantive Session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) who 
committed themselves to “develop[ing] and implement[ing] strategies that give youth everywhere a 
real and equal opportunity to find full and productive employment and decent work” and reiterated 
their commitment “to mainstream youth employment into national development strategies and 
agendas; to develop policies and programmes for enhancing the employability of youth, including 
through education, training and lifelong learning that meet labour market requirements; and to 
promote access to work through integrated policies that enable the creation of new and quality jobs 
for young people and facilitate access to those jobs, including through information and training 
initiatives”.5 This report uses the latest available information in order to analyze labour market 
conditions for young people and identify barriers that can stand in the way of realizing these global 
commitments. It highlights the importance of focusing on youth and provides the ingredients from 
which strategies can be developed to tackle one of the most urgent and widely recognized global 
challenges.  
This second Global Employment Trends for Youth (2006) updates the world and regional 
youth labour market indicators presented in the first Global Employment Trends for Youth (2004) 
report (section 2). This report goes beyond this, however, to investigate the relationship between the 
lack of decent employment opportunities and poverty to explain why many young people remain poor 
despite the fact that they work (section 3). Section 4 of the report offers a more in-depth analysis of 
factors that explain one of the worrying indicators – inactivity – and the reasons for its increase in 
recent years. This section also offers a framework for identifying youth who are more vulnerable to 
getting stuck in labour market situations that will be detrimental to their own future development and 
to that of the economy at large. Section 5 focuses on the school-to-work transition to help countries 
pinpoint the specific challenges that young men and women face when entering the world of work so 
that the most appropriate policy mix can be determined to redress the situation within countries.  
Why focus on youth?  
Youth unemployment and situations in which young people give up on the job search 
(“discouragement”) or work under inadequate conditions (“underemployment”) incur costs to the 
economy, to society and to the individual and their family. A lack of decent work, if experienced at an 
early age, often permanently compromises a person’s future employment prospects and frequently 
leads to unsuitable labour behaviour patterns that last a lifetime. There is a proven link between youth 
unemployment and social exclusion.6 An inability to find employment creates a sense of vulnerability, 
uselessness and idleness among young people.7 The most obvious gains then, in making the most of 
                                                 
3
 ILO, 2006c.  
4
 Secretary-General's address to the 4th European Union/Latin America and Caribbean Heads of State Summit, Vienna, 12 
May 2006; www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2030. 
5
 Reference is made to the Ministerial Declaration of the High-level Segment of ECOSOC to strengthen global efforts 
towards generating more decent work opportunities as necessary means for achieving the international development goals to 
cut the numbers of people living in extreme poverty by half by 2015. The Declaration builds on the work of the ILO to 
promote a decent work agenda for reducing poverty and obtaining equitable, inclusive and sustainable development. See 
ECOSOC High-level Segment: Ministerial Declaration, 5 July 2006, E/2006/L.8. 
6
 See, for example, Ryan, 2000, and ECA, 2005. 
7
 ILO, 2003, p. 25. See also UN, 2005, p. 46. 
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the productive potential of youth and ensuring the availability of decent employment opportunities for 
youth, are the personal gains to the young people themselves.  
Box 1 
What is “youth”? 
This report defines youth as the 15 to 24 age group as this is a widely accepted statistical convention. (See UN, 
1992.) Differences continue to exist, however, in the way many national statistics programmes define and 
measure youth.  
Definitions of “youth” are based in part on the end use of the measurement. If one aims to measure, for example, 
the age span at which one is expected to enter the labour market then the statistical definition of 15 to 24 years 
may no longer be valid, given that today more and more young people postpone their entry into labour markets 
to well beyond the age of 25. Alternatively, if one were to aim for the broader characteristic-based classification 
of youth (as opposed to a simple age-based definition), then a more sociological viewpoint on what constitutes 
“youth” is needed. For example, one might wish to define “youth” as the transition stage from childhood to 
adulthood, in which case the age at which this transition begins will vary greatly between societies and indeed 
within the same society. From the perspective of a critical stage in the lifecycle, the relevant age could be as low 
as 10 years (e.g. street kids) to as high as mid to late 30s. The wider age span suggests that the process of 
obtaining a sustaining livelihood, if that is taken as the basic criteria for passage into the next life stage – 
adulthood – can take a long time, particularly in poor societies.  
Sources: Curtain, 2002 and 2004. See also UN, 2005, p. 95, for further discussion on the blurring boundaries 
between youth and adults. 
The second obvious gain to recapturing the productive potential of underutilized youth is an 
economic one. Idle youth is a costly group. They are not contributing to the economic welfare of the 
country – quite the contrary. The loss of income among the younger generation translates into a lack of 
savings as well as a loss of aggregate demand. Some youth who are unable to earn their own income 
have to be financially supported by the family, leaving less for spending and investments at the 
household level. Societies lose their investment in education. Governments fail to receive 
contributions to social security systems and are forced to increase spending on remedial services, 
including crime or drug use prevention efforts. All this is a threat to the development potential of 
economies. Focusing on youth, therefore, makes sense to a country from a costs-benefits point of 
view.  
It is also important to focus on youth because they are the drivers of economic development in 
a country. Young people might lack experience but they tend to be highly motivated and capable of 
offering new ideas or insights. Foregoing this potential is an economic waste. In the 2004 report, the 
ILO estimated that halving the world’s youth unemployment rate, and thus bringing it more in line 
with the adult rate while allowing for some natural differences, would add between an estimated US$ 
2.2 and 3.5 trillion of the 2003 value, or between 4.4 and 7.0 per cent, to the global GDP.8  
How are young people faring in the labour market? 
This basic question was addressed in the report of two years ago. Unfortunately, there has 
been little change in the general global trends for youth employment reported on in the previous 
report. Information from sections 2 and 3 of this report confirm the following:  
Some global trends 
• The global youth labour force, which is the sum of the employed youth and unemployed youth, 
grew from 602 to 633 million (by 5.2 per cent) between 1995 and 2005 and is projected to grow 
by another 24 million to 657 million in 2015 (table 2.2).  
• The share of the youth labour force in the youth population (the youth labour force participation 
rate) decreased globally from 58.9 to 54.7 per cent between 1995 and 2005, which means that in 
2005 only every second young person was actively participating in labour markets around the 
world. Conversely, the youth inactivity rate (as a measure of the share of young people who are 
                                                 
8
 GDP was measured in current PPP-adjusted dollars for 2003. The estimates were based on historical country-level GDP-to-
youth employment elasticities.  
3 
outside of the labour force in the youth population) rose from 41.1 to 45.3 per cent over the same 
period (tables 2.3 and 4.1). 
• In 2005, the number of employed young people was 548 million, an increase of 20.1 million from 
ten years before. However, because the youth population grew at a quicker pace than youth 
employment, the share of youth who are employed in the youth population (the youth 
employment-to-population-ratio) saw a decrease from 51.6 to 47.3 per cent between 1995 and 
2005 (table 2.4). 
• The number of young unemployed increased from 74 million to 85 million between 1995 and 
2005, an increase of 14.8 per cent (table 2.5). 
• The youth unemployment rate, a measure of the percentage of young people who are looking but 
unable to find work in the youth labour force, stood at 13.5 per cent in 2005 (compared to 6.4 per 
cent for the overall global unemployment rate9 and 4.5 per cent for the adult unemployment rate) 
(figure 2.3).10  
• Compared to adults, the youth of today are still more than three times as likely to be unemployed; 
the ratio of the youth-to-adult unemployment rate was 3.0 in 2005, up from 2.8 in 1995 (see 
table 2.6).  
• The youth unemployed make up almost half (43.7 per cent) of the world’s total unemployed 
despite the fact that, in comparison, the youth share of the total working-age population (ages 15 
and over) was only 25.0 per cent (table 2.7). 
• There are an estimated 125 million young working poor, meaning more than 20 per cent of 
employed youth lived in a household where there was less than US$1 a day available per head in 
2005. There were approximately 300 million young working poor at the US$2 a day level – more 
than one half of all young women and men who worked – in the same year (table 3.2). 
Some regional trends11  
• As much as 89 per cent of the world’s youth were living in developing economies in 2005. 
• Youth labour force growth will continue to be concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, South East 
Asia and the Pacific, and in the Middle East and North Africa – regions where insufficient 
economic demand already results in significant unemployment rates for youth. Between 1995 and 
2005, these regions are projected to add another 24 million, 11 million and 865,000 young labour 
market participants, respectively. In the meantime, the size of the youth labour force will decrease 
in all other regions, and most considerably in East Asia (table 2.2). 
• Youth labour force participation rates were highest in East Asia (67.3 per cent) and sub-Saharan 
Africa (65.5 per cent) in 2005. The lowest rate was that of the Middle East and North Africa (40.0 
per cent). Labour force participation rates decreased during the last decade in all regions for young 
men, whereas for young women it decreased in all regions except the Middle East and North 
Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (table 2.3). 
• The only region where the youth employment-to-population ratio increased between 1995 and 
2005 was the Middle East and North Africa, which is noteworthy given the tremendous growth of 
the youth population in the region of over 30 per cent during this period that the labour market has 
had to accommodate. But at the same time the region still had the lowest youth employment-to-
population ratio at 29.7. East Asia had the highest employment-to-population ratio at 62.1 but also 
the second biggest decrease over the last ten years of -10.6 per cent (behind an 11.8 per cent 
decrease in Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS). All other regions witnessed decreases 
                                                 
9
 The latest ILO world and regional estimates of labour market indicators for the aggregate population are available from 
ILO, 2006c. 
10
 Differences to earlier estimates (in the 2004 report) are due to the fact that more country level data were available for input 
into the model used to generate missing country values for the aggregation to world and regional levels (see box 2). Other 
input data used in the estimation model have changed as well, including revisions of the IMF estimates of GDP growth. 
11
 See the text in section 2 and Annex 1 for more regional highlights. 
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as well with the exception of the Developed Economies and European Union where it stayed more 
or less stable over the decade (table 2.4). 
• Most regions saw increases in the number of unemployed youth between 1995 and 2005. The 
largest increase of 85.5 per cent (from 5.2 to 9.7 million) was in South East Asia and the Pacific, 
followed by 34.2 per cent (from 13.0 to 17.4 million) in sub-Saharan Africa, 23.0 per cent (from 
7.7 to 9.5 million) in Latin America and the Caribbean, 18.2 per cent (from 7.2 to 8.5 million) in 
the Middle East and North Africa, and 16.1 per cent in South Asia (from 11.8 to 13.7 million) 
(table 2.5).  
• The highest regional youth unemployment rate can be observed in the Middle East and North 
Africa at 25.7 per cent in 2005. Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS had the second 
highest rate at 19.9 per cent. Sub-Saharan Africa’s rate was 18.1 per cent, followed by Latin 
America and the Caribbean (16.6 per cent), South East Asia and the Pacific (15.8 per cent), the 
Developed Economies and European Union (13.1 per cent), South Asia (10 per cent) and East 
Asia (7.8 per cent). The only region that saw a considerable decrease over the last ten years was 
the Developed Economies and European Union (figure 2.4). 
• In most regions youth were nearly three times more likely to be unemployed than adults. The only 
exceptions were the Developed Economies and European Union where youth unemployment was 
only 2.3 times higher than adult unemployment in 2005 and, on the other end of the scale, South 
East Asia and the Pacific, where youth unemployment was more than 5 times higher than adult 
unemployment (table 2.6). 
• In all regions, youth have higher shares of unemployment and inactivity and lower employment 
shares compared to adults (figure 2.5). 
• Working poverty among youth is most alarming for sub-Saharan Africa, the only region that has 
seen a sharp and continuous increase of the total number of youth working poor at the US$1 a 
day level (from 36 million to 45 million between 1995 and 2005). Extreme working poverty is 
also still a big problem in South Asia, where almost 4 out of 10 young people work but remain 
poor. But at least the long term trend has shown some improvement in the region; ten years ago, 
almost 6 out of 10 young working people were US$1 a day working poor, which was almost as 
much as in sub-Saharan Africa (table 3.2). 
• Youth US$2 a day working poverty decreased most in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) and CIS and in East Asia. In South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa only one out of ten 
young people earn enough to lift themselves together with their families above the threshold of 
US$2 a day. 
The two diagrams in figure 1 show what it is possible to quantify given the current state of 
labour market statistics for young people within the global community. Sufficient country-level 
information exist to allow the classification of the youth population into three main activity groups: a) 
employed, b) unemployed and c) outside of the labour force, or “inactive” (using the Global 
Employment Trends Model described in box 2). Consequently, this provides the basis for the findings 
highlighted in the bullet points above concerning the global youth labour market. It is also possible to 
identify two negative trends that have occurred over the last ten years: there was a decreasing share of 
employed youth in the total youth population (from 51.6 to 47.3 per cent) and an increasing share of 
unemployed youth (from 7.3 to 7.4 per cent12). In addition, the share of the youth population who are 
inactive (outside of the labour force) increased from 41.1 to 45.3 per cent.  
A deficit of decent work opportunities impacts not only young people who are looking but 
unable to find employment – the unemployed – but also results in a situation where young women and 
men work under poor conditions (the “underemployed”13) or involuntarily fall outside of the labour 
                                                 
12
 The share of unemployed youth in the youth population given here is not the same as the youth unemployment rate since 
the youth unemployment rate is the share of unemployed youth in the youth labour force. See Annex 3 for a more detailed 
glossary of labour market terms. 
13
 Underemployment reflects underutilization of the labour force and has been broadly interpreted to imply any sort of 
employment that is “unsatisfactory” (as perceived by the workers) in terms of insufficient hours (time-related 
underemployment), insufficient compensation (income-related underemployment) or insufficient use of ones skills (skills-
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force due to their belief that there is no work available for them (the “discouraged workers”14). 
Regardless of their economic activity status (employed, unemployed or inactive), young people who 
are not able to make the most of their productive potential are susceptible to feelings of despondency, 
to marginalization and impoverishment, to idleness and potential attraction to illicit activities, to 
feeling frustrated with their situation and to directing their anger and frustration at the society that 
created it. These are the young people who would benefit the most from policy interventions aimed to 
increase decent work opportunities for youth. 
Figure 1 
What we do and do not know about the global youth labour market 
 
The calculation of the full extent of a decent work deficit for young people, therefore, would 
require data on the number of unemployed youth, the number of underemployed youth and the number 
of discouraged youth. Unfortunately, due to a lack of country level data, the ILO cannot quantify at the 
global or regional level either: 1) the distribution of the employed youth who are fully employed 
versus underemployed or 2) the share among inactive youth who are inactive because they are in full-
time education, because they have become discouraged with the job search (the discouraged workers) 
or for other reasons (inactivity by reason is discussed at greater length in section 4). Therefore, at this 
time, it is not possible to precisely calculate the full extent of the deficit of decent work opportunities 
and the size of the vulnerable youth population who fall within the deficit.  
What is possible, however, is to generate a fair approximation of the youth population who fall 
within the decent work opportunity deficit based on two assumptions: first, that the number of young 
people who work, yet live in households that have less than US$2 a day per person (the US$2 a day 
working poor, as calculated in section 3) is a sound proxy for income-related underemployment, and 
second, that discouraged youth are likely to constitute at least 4 per cent of the inactive youth 
population.15 The ILO estimates, therefore, that currently 85 million unemployed youth, 300 million 
working poor youth at the US$2 a day level and 20 million discouraged youth, or a total of 400 million 
young people, are impacted by a current deficit of decent work opportunities. In other words, 
approximately 35 per cent of the youth population, or one in three youth, suffers from an inability to 
find or maintain decent work that allows them to fulfill their economic potential while earning 
sufficient returns to lift themselves and their families above the poverty line. 
                                                                                                                                                        
related underemployment). To date, time-related underemployment is the only component of underemployment that has been 
agreed on and properly defined for measurement purposes within the international community of labour statisticians. See the 
Resolution concerning the measurement of underemployment and inadequate employment situations, adopted by the 16th 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians, Geneva, 1998; 
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/res/underemp.pdf. 
14
 For a more technical discussion of discouraged workers and the complexities of measurement, see ILO, 1990, pp. 107-08. 
See also section 4 of this report.  
15
 Using data from the only collection of statistics on discouraged workers, that of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), we calculated that among OECD countries the share of young discouraged workers in 
the youth population outside of the labour force (inactive youth) was 2.6 per cent in 2004. We estimate that the global share 
of young discouraged workers would be slightly higher – 4 per cent – due to a higher presence of discouragement in some 
regions, for example, in Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS. Four per cent of 525 million inactive youth comes to 
approximately 20 million discouraged youth. 
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Box 2 
ILO methodology for producing world and regional estimates of labour market indicators 
In an ideal world, producing world and regional estimates of labour market indicators, such as youth 
employment, for example, would simply require summing up the total number of employed persons aged 15 to 
24 years across all countries in the world or within a given region. However, because not all countries report data 
in every year and, indeed, some countries do not report data for any years at all, it is not possible to derive 
aggregate estimates of labour market indicators by merely summing up across countries. The biggest challenge 
in the production of aggregate estimates is thereby that of missing data. 
To address the problem of missing data, the ILO has designed, and actively maintains, three econometric models 
which are used to produce estimates of labour market indicators in the countries and years for which no real data 
exist. The Global Employment Trends Model (GET Model) is used to produce estimates – disaggregated by 
age and sex – of unemployment, employment, employment by sector and employment elasticities. The world 
and regional labour force estimates discussed in this paper are estimated using the Trends Labour Force Model 
(TLF Model), and finally, the working poor estimates used in section 3 come from the Trends Working 
Poverty Model (TWP Model).  
Each of these models uses multivariate regression techniques to impute missing values at the country level. The 
first step in each model is to assemble every known piece of real information (i.e. every real data point) for each 
indicator in question. It is important to note that only data that are national in coverage and comparable across 
countries and over time are used as inputs. This is an important selection criterion when the models are run, 
because they are designed to use the relationship between the various labour market indicators and their 
macroeconomic correlates (such as per capita GDP, GDP growth rates, demographic trends, country membership 
in the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, geographic indicators and country and time dummy 
variables) in order to produce estimates of the labour market indicators where no data exist. Thus, the 
comparability of the labour market data that are used as inputs in the imputation models is essential to ensure 
that the models capture as accurately as possible the relationship between the labour market indicators and the 
macroeconomic variables. The last step of the estimation procedure occurs once the datasets containing both the 
real and imputed labour market data have been assembled. In this step, the ILO Trends Team aggregates the data 
across countries to produce the final world and regional estimates.  
For further information on the world and regional econometric models, readers can consult the following 
technical background papers: Crespi, 2004, Kapsos, 2004 and (forthcoming) 2006.  
Misconceptions concerning youth and youth labour markets 
Overcoming prejudices regarding youth labour markets is an important step toward redefining 
old strategies and developing new ones that really get to the root of the youth labour market 
challenges. Misconceptions, such as those identified below, often result from insufficient labour 
market information or inadequate analyses of labour market information. Strengthening the capacity 
for labour market information collection and dissemination within countries and capacity building on 
the usages of information by policy-makers and young people themselves will be key to ensuring that 
misconceptions are cleared up and that policies and programmes are based on the actual needs of 
young people as identified through careful analysis.  
Misconception 1: Access to education is no longer a problem for young people.  
It is true that education enrolment is on the rise around the world and more young people are 
going to school and staying in school for longer periods of time; out of 163 countries with data 
available on gross enrollment rates in secondary-level education, 137 saw increased rates over the 
period 1990 to 2002. Gross enrollment rates also increased at the tertiary level in 124 out of 144 
countries.16 Yet low enrolment rates remain a substantial problem in many countries17, as does 
illiteracy. In sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia more than a third of the youth population was still 
illiterate in 2002.18 Access to education remains a luxury that many households simply cannot afford 
                                                 
16
 Gross enrollment rates are from World Bank, 2005.  
17
 On average, the secondary enrolment rate in sub-Saharan Africa was still quite low at 35 per cent in 2001. The only other 
region where the number of persons enrolled in secondary education was less than half of the population of the corresponding 
age group was South Asia at 45 per cent. (Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank, 2005.)  
18
 Countries with youth illiteracy rates in excess of 33 per cent in the latest year of data availability (typically 2002) include 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Data are from ILO, 2005a, table 
14c.  
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for their children. So, while it is true that many young people, as well as societies, are benefiting from 
improved education levels, it is important to remember that the gains are far from universal and that 
special attention still needs to be paid to promoting free and universal education in poor countries 
where the opportunity costs to young people and their families of staying in school are prohibitively 
high.  
Misconception 2: Because young people today are better educated than ever they will have less 
trouble finding work. 
This statement assumes that there is sufficient demand for educated youth so that the young 
person holding a higher level degree will have no difficulty finding work. This is true in some 
developed economies, but in many developing economies, where economic development has not kept 
pace with the increases in educational attainment and/or the educational system has not provided 
young people with the skills most needed in the economy, the high unemployment rates of youth with 
higher education degrees show otherwise.  
Misconception 3: Young people like to “shop around” to find the best job. Therefore, they will choose 
to take up numerous short-term, temporary posts in order to gain experience and find the “best fit”.  
A young person can “shop around” for the best job only in an economy with robust economic 
growth that results in strong demand by employers for her/his particular skills. A good example would 
be the strong demand for computer programmers in the United States in the 1990s that resulted in a 
situation in which the prospective computer programmer could “bargain” for the best employment 
contract terms and could choose to change jobs even numerous times in one year. The system of 
moving in and out of temporary employment and only eventually (if ever) into permanent 
employment, worked for some young people in a boom economy like that of the United States in the 
1990s, but the situation there was clearly unique.   
Where there is little economic growth or a shrinking employment content of growth (measured 
with employment elasticities),19 there is unlikely to be an opportunities to shop around for the best job. 
If a young person in a poor country is lucky enough to find work in the formal sector, s/he will be 
unlikely to change jobs, even if the job does not make good use of her/his talents. Security will 
overrule job satisfaction as a motivator for young employees in low-income countries. Therefore, short 
job tenure and “shopping around” is a phenomenon almost exclusively pertaining to developed 
economies or of wealthier youth in developing economies. It certainly cannot explain the fact that 
youth are over three times more likely to be affected by unemployment than adults. 
Even in developed economies, however, the desire of young people for job security remains a 
primary concern. France is a case in point. In February 2006 the Government of France introduced the 
“first employment contract” (Contrat Première Embauche, CPE) with the aim of encouraging 
companies to hire young people by introducing a flexible system allowing them to hire those under the 
age of 26 for a period of two years during which the employee could be dismissed at any time and for 
any reason. Widespread popular opposition to the reduction in job security for young people that the 
introduction of the CPE was perceived to create led to its early withdrawal.  
Misconception 4: Unemployment is the key labour market challenge for youth. 
Youth unemployment is only the tip of the iceberg. Although more difficult to quantify, there 
are two other groups that together outnumber the unemployed youth but suffer from the same 
frustrations as the unemployed: the discouraged youth and the working poor. In countries without 
effective unemployment support mechanisms, concentrating on unemployment also runs the risk of 
excluding from the analysis the less privileged population who simply cannot afford to be 
unemployed. In several developing countries, young people of higher socio-economic backgrounds are 
over-represented in the unemployment numbers because it is only they who can afford to spend time 
looking for work, without incoming wages. The problem is not so much unemployment, therefore, in 
developing countries but rather the conditions of work of those who are employed. In such cases the 
indicators mentioned in section 2 which relate more to conditions of work would be a much more 
informative gauge of the labour market situation of youth. 
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 See “Trends in the employment intensity of economic growth” in ILO, 2005a, Chapter 1. 
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Misconception 5: Youth unemployment rates give an accurate picture of youth labour market 
challenges. 
This misconception is closely related to the previous one. If we accept that some young people 
who are working (the working poor, young workers without a contract, young people in hazardous 
work, as examples) and some young people who are inactive (the discouraged workers) are also in 
situations that place them far from the goal of achieving full and productive employment, then looking 
at youth unemployment rates to the exclusion of other indicators would mean ignoring a large portion 
of the youth population that requires equal attention by policy-makers aiming to improve the 
productive potential of youth populations. Indicators such as the youth labour force participation rate, 
employment-to-population ratio, employment by status or sector and the share of young people who 
are neither in employment nor in education in the youth population should be used to balance the 
youth unemployment rates when making a general assessment of youth labour market challenges.  
An additional criticism of the aggregate unemployment rate for youth is that it masks 
information on the composition of the young jobless population and therefore misses out on the 
particularities of the education level, ethnic origin, socio-economic background, work experience, etc., 
of the unemployed.20 Moreover, the unemployment rate says nothing about the type of unemployment 
(is it cyclical or structural?), which is a critical issue for policy-makers in the development of their 
policy responses (structural unemployment cannot be addressed by boosting market demand only).  
Misconception 6: Youth are a homogenous group and strategies to tackle youth labour market 
challenges can be uniformly applied within and across countries.  
Perhaps this is the most blatant misconception. A young person born in Burundi cannot be 
compared to a young person in, say, China in terms of the opportunities and constraints placed before 
them. And even within countries, there are numerous subgroups of youth that face discrimination 
based on their ethnicity, age, family background or geographic location. (See box 2.2.) Numerous 
illustrations in this report identify youth who face specific challenges in the search for decent work – 
young migrants, young women, youth in rural areas, young refugees. Youth are not a homogenous 
group which is why targeted interventions aimed at overcoming the specific disadvantages that some 
youth face in entering and remaining in the labour market will be warranted. What is important to 
remember is that despite the individual characteristics that make up each young person, where youth 
are equal to one another is in their right to strive for and obtain full and productive employment. 
Misconception 7: With many young people migrating to urban areas, there is no pressing need to 
address the labour market challenges of young people living in rural areas.   
Despite increasing numbers of young people who migrate from rural to urban areas in search 
of better opportunities, focusing on the development of young people in rural areas still makes sense 
for several reasons. First, the agricultural sector (and thus rural areas) still accounts for more than 40 
per cent of total employment in the world and is still the dominant sector for employment in East Asia, 
South East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.21 Improving wages and 
productivity within the rural economy – through poverty reduction strategies, improvements in 
infrastructure, programmes that promote savings and innovation, development of the rural non-farm 
sector, etc. – could go a long way toward promoting the structural transformation of rural areas that 
would in turn stem the tide of rural to urban migration among young people.22 Second, unemployment 
rates tend to be even higher in crowded, urban cities where increasing numbers of rural migrants 
compete for limited numbers of jobs. Investing in youth in rural areas in a way that decreases their 
likelihood of migrating would, therefore, have the side effect of helping to improve conditions for 
young people in urban areas. Finally, it has been shown that employment creation in rural areas has a 
higher impact on poverty reduction than in urban areas simply because poverty tends to be 
concentrated in rural areas.23  
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 Godfrey, 2003. 
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 ILO, 2006c, table 5. 
22
 For more information on structural transformation as a means to “break away” from poverty, particularly in Africa, see 
UN, 2005, chapter 4. 
23
 UN, 2005, p. 129 estimates that 70 per cent of poor people in Africa are living in rural areas.  
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Misconception 8: Young people are poor because they do not work. 
There are many contexts in which poverty occurs. Some people are poor but are supported by 
social safety nets – either formal in the terms of government support or informal support within the 
family – which may or may not be “generous” enough to allow them to survive without working. 
Some people live in poverty that results in malnourishment and sickness which leaves them unable to 
work.24 But for the most part, there are people living in extreme poverty who lack social safety nets 
and must therefore try to survive by any means possible – through ingenuity, courage, self-discipline 
and most of all through work.25 No opportunity to earn some money or payment in kind for oneself or 
one’s family can be missed. Young people living in extremely poor families also have to work in some 
way or other, usually at the bare subsistence level. The data on the youth working poor presented in 
section 3 offer the best proof against this misconception. At the global level, as many as 125 million 
young people live in households where the income comes to less than US$1 a day per household 
member despite the fact that they work. So almost 23 per cent of young people are extremely poor 
(US$1 a day level) despite the fact that they work. Even more dramatic is the estimate that as much as 
56 per cent of young people who work remain poor at the US$2 a day level.  
Misconception 9: It is better to gear job creation programmes toward adult jobseekers rather than 
youth jobseekers because adult jobseekers will need the wages more than the young to support their 
families. 
If one were able to measure the immediate need of the jobseeker and distribute jobs according 
to need, then perhaps it would make sense to give a post to an adult who is the sole support of a 
household of five rather than to a young person who could still rely on the financial support of his/her 
parents. But how accurate is the generalization that adults have greater financial need than youth? A 
young person might also have branched out from the family to start up his/her own household in 
which case the need would be the same. But in the absence of such information, we come back to the 
core question of: does it really matter? Unemployment has its costs, at least if experienced for a long 
period or over multiple periods, in terms of loss of self-esteem, loss of income and social exclusion, 
and there is no reason to suppose that one segment of society can bear the costs better than another. In 
effect, there is growing evidence to the fact that being unemployed at an early age has a direct 
negative impact on future income streams. For instance, research has shown that a young person 
whose first experience in the labour market is one of long-term unemployment is likely to move 
between stages of unemployment and low-wage employment throughout the rest of his/her working 
life.26 Bearing the long-term costs in mind, focusing job creation efforts on young people in an attempt 
to reverse these trends and giving youth the opportunity to become more active and productive 
participants in the workforce makes sense. However, employment policies targeted at young people 
should be integrated into overall employment strategies at the national level so as not to isolate one 
segment of society to the detriment of others.  
Summary and outlook 
The case for investing in youth, although reiterated at the level of rhetoric, is unfortunately not 
often enough put into practice. The challenge is for governments, employers’ organizations, trade 
unions, international development partners and civil society bodies to tap into this vast productive 
potential. Investment in job creation and increased employability for young men and women could 
provide massive returns. Indeed, the ILO estimates that halving the rate of youth unemployment could 
have added an estimated US$ 2.2 to 3.5 trillion to the world economy in 2003. This represented 4.4 to 
7 per cent of the 2003 value of global GDP.  
The data available reveal several negative trends with respect to youth labour markets, among 
which are the decreasing share of employed youth and the increasing share of unemployed youth in 
the youth population and the persistence of poverty among as much as 56 per cent of young workers. 
Taking into account the unemployed youth (85 million), the working poor youth (300 million at the 
US$2 a day level) and discouraged youth (roughly approximated at 20 million), the ILO estimates that 
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 The UN estimated that there were a total of 160 million severely undernourished young people in the world (see section 3, 
table 3.1). 
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 ILO, 2003. 
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 See, for example, Gregg and Tominey, 2004. 
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at least 400 million decent employment opportunities are needed in order to reach the full productive 
potential of today’s youth. This figure is conservative since it does not cover the young people who are 
already working but working under poor conditions not related to remuneration (lack of contract, long 
hours, etc.). But underestimated or not, the assumption that more than one third of the youth 
population suffers from a deficit of decent work opportunities is striking enough for concern. Imagine 
what a difference it would make if all this wasted potential was tapped. Creation of decent work 
opportunities for young people should be the priority in terms of turning what is currently wasted 
productive capacity in large parts of the world into a positive force for development.  
Attaining and maintaining decent employment – work that offers a worker a good income, 
security, flexibility, protection and a voice at work – is a challenge for any person. The importance of 
starting off right is perhaps even more urgent for young people since it is the initial transition to the 
labour force that is most significant in determining the economic (and social) well-being of the 
individual and, if taken collectively, in determining the level of development of the country. Without 
the proper foothold from which to start out right in the labour market, young people are less able to 
make choices that will improve their own job prospects and those of their future dependants, thus 
perpetuating the cycle of insufficient education, low productivity employment and poverty from one 
generation to the next.  
11 
2. Labour market trends for youth 
 
2.1 Demographic trends and developments in youth labour force participation 
Population growth is slowing down but the poorest regions  
still face the greatest need for decent job creation 
The share of the world’s youth population in developing countries continues to increase while 
the share in the developed countries decreases, despite declining fertility rates in most developing 
countries. As much as 89 per cent of the world’s youth were living in developing economies in 2005. 
The three Asian regions alone – East Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia – together 
accounted for more than half (54 per cent) of the world youth population. Two developing regions – 
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa – are expected to see large increases in youth populations between 
2005 and 2015 and are therefore the two regions whose shares of the world’s total population are 
expected to increase. The world’s share of youth living in sub-Saharan Africa will increase from 13 
per cent to 15 per cent while the global share of youth in South Asia is expected to increase from 25 to 
28 per cent. (See figure 2.1.) 
Figure 2.1 
Regional distribution of the youth population, 2005 and 2015 
 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information) (2005 estimates) and ILO, 
Economically Active Population and Projections (EAPAP) database; available at http://laborsta.ilo.org (2015 estimates). 
Nonetheless, as is evident from the charts in figure 2.2 showing the regional population 
distributions by age group – 0 to 14 years (children), 15 to 24 years (youth) and 25 years and over 
(adults) – in all regions the youth share in the overall population is declining, a clear sign that the 
developing world is nearing the final stage of the demographic transition.27 However, the youth share 
in total population remains on markedly different levels across regions and is declining at different 
rates. The youth cohort will still make up approximately one-fifth of the total population by 2015 in 
the regions of sub-Saharan Africa (20.8 per cent), South Asia (19.2 per cent), South East Asia and the 
Pacific (18.1 per cent) and the Middle East and North Africa (18.0 per cent).  
From population trends to working-age population trends . . . 
If we look instead at the share of youth in the total working-age population (typically ages 15 
years and over) we also expect to see a decrease in all regions in the years to come, but the difference 
between the regions regarding the size of this share is considerable (see table 2.1). The youth share in 
working-age population is highest in sub-Saharan Africa (36.9 per cent), followed by 32.6 per cent in 
the Middle East and North Africa, 29.3 per cent in South Asia, 27.5 per cent in South East Asia and 
the Pacific, 22.1 per cent in Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS, 20.9 per cent in East Asia, 
and 15.7 per cent in Developed Economies and European Union. Disturbingly, it is the regions with 
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 In general, a country proceeds through three stages of demographic shifts: in the first stage, the proportion of the young in 
the population rises; in the second stage, the proportion of young people declines, that of the elderly cohort (aged 65+) 
increases modestly and, most importantly, that of adults (aged 25-64) increases sharply; finally, in the third stage, the 
proportion of adults falls while that of old people rises. 
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 Figure 2.2 
Population distribution by child, youth and adult age cohorts, by region, 1995, 2005 and 2015 
 
Note: The child cohort is persons aged 0-14 years, youth aged 15-24, and adults aged 25+. 
Sources: Population shares are authors’ calculations based on UN, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database, Panel 2: Detailed data, median variant; http://esa.un.org/unpp/.
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the higher share that performed less well in terms of economic development over the last decade 
which makes it especially hard to create enough decent jobs for young people. In the case of South 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, these are also the regions where poverty rates are the highest and which 
struggle the most with creating a sufficient amount of decent jobs to allow the population to “work out 
of poverty”.28 It is in these regions that future prospects for young people are most pessimistic. 
Table 2.1 
Youth share in total working-age population, 1995 and 2005 
  
Youth share in total working-age 
population (%) 
  1995 2005 
World 26.3 25.0 
Developed Economies and European Union 17.2 15.7 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 21.6 22.1 
East Asia 24.6 20.9 
South East Asia and the Pacific 30.7 27.5 
South Asia 30.0 29.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean 30.0 26.9 
Middle East and North Africa 33.5 32.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.7 36.9 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
 
. . . to labour force trends 
The labour force is the sum of employed persons and unemployed person (see Annex 3 for a 
full glossary of labour market terms). There is no clear short-term correlation between the population 
size of the youth cohort and the size of the youth labour force, but, as seen in table 2.2, in those cases 
where the youth population grew rapidly between 1995 and 2005, there is a large, albeit lesser, 
corresponding growth in the size of the labour force. Over the last ten years, large increases in the 
youth population have been accompanied by significant youth labour force growth in South Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Table 2.2 
Development of the youth labour force and youth population between 1995 and 2005 and 
expected net growth of the youth labour force between 2005 and 2015 
  
Youth labour force ('000s) Youth population ('000s) 
  1995 2005 2015 
% 
change 
1995-
2005 
Net 
growth 
2005-
2015 
('000s) 1995 2005 
% 
change 
1995-
2005 
World 602'188 633'255 657'209 5.2 23'955 1'023'228 1'158'010 13.2 
Developed Economies and 
European Union 67'740 64'501 61'167 -4.8 -3'334 126'434 124'404 -1.6 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-
EU) and CIS 30'430 29'661 23'989 -2.5 -5'672 64'453 70'941 10.1 
East Asia 176'137 154'511 139'596 -12.3 -14'915 234'364 229'488 -2.1 
South East Asia and the Pacific 56'703 61'490 72'889 8.4 11'399 97'548 108'909 11.6 
South Asia 118'278 136'616 148'293 15.5 11'677 233'818 289'160 23.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean 53'738 57'149 56'649 6.3 -500 95'303 105'468 10.7 
Middle East and North Africa 25'086 33'174 34'039 32.2 865 62'651 82'915 32.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 74'077 96'153 120'587 29.8 24'434 108'658 146'726 35.0 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
Overall the youth labour force grew from 602 million to 633 million over the last decade (5.2 
per cent) and is projected to grow from 633 million to 657 million (3.8 per cent) from 2005 to 2015. 
Labour force growth was highest in the Middle East and North Africa at 32.2 per cent and sub-Saharan 
Africa at 29.8 per cent, followed by South Asia (15.5 per cent), South East Asia and the Pacific (8.4 
per cent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (6.3 per cent). Despite youth population growth, the 
labour force decreased in Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS (-2.5 per cent). The final two 
regions – Developed Economies and European Union and East Asia – showed declining trends in both 
the youth labour force and youth population, although the size of the youth labour forces declined at a 
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 The concept of “working out of poverty” was introduced in ILO, 2003. 
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faster pace (-4.8 per cent and -12.3 per cent, respectively) than the decline in youth population (-1.6 
and -2.1 per cent, respectively). (For further discussion of the decline labour force in some regions, see 
section 4.) 
Between 2005 and 2015 it is expected that the youth labour force will continue to grow by 
another 24 million. The growth will continue to be concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, South East 
Asia and the Pacific, and in the Middle East and North Africa. These regions are projected to add 
another 24 million, 11 million and 865,000 young labour market participants, respectively. In the 
meantime, the size of the youth labour force will decrease in all other regions, and most considerably 
in East Asia. 
A growing labour force can be an asset or a liability for economic development  
depending on the rate of growth and the employment content of growth in the country 
A growing labour force can be an asset for labour markets and societies if the economy needs 
labour and has enough jobs to offer. However, if economic growth is not matched by growth of decent 
employment opportunities, labour force growth can be a threat since the competition to find jobs 
among the many young people entering the labour market becomes more intense. In labour markets 
where an excess supply of job seekers compete for vacancies, it is the young people who lack social 
networks and the know-how to market themselves as potential employees who will be the ones left 
behind to join the growing number of unemployed or discouraged youth (again, see Annex 3 for the 
glossary of terms). Alternatively, they will accept work under inferior conditions or move into the 
informal economy which offers the only possibility of earning a living. This vicious circle that results 
when economic growth cannot accommodate labour force growth has been observed in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Conversely, a decreasing labour force can 
also be a challenge as can be witnessed in many developed economies, (former) transition economies 
and, to a certain extent, also in East Asia, where labour shortages may be starting to retard economic 
development.29 
The share of the labour force in the working-age population – the labour force participation 
rate – can be high or low depending on cultural traditions, educational attainment and the degree of 
inactivity (voluntary or involuntary) in a country. The trend of decreasing youth labour force 
participation rates has continued in recent years mainly as a result of more young people choosing to 
remain in education and extending their stay in education and because of growing discouragement in 
those economies where labour market conditions for young people are particularly bad. (For a detailed 
discussion on which factors impacts inactivity rates, see section 4 of this report.)  
Youth labour force participation rates are decreasing in all regions 
The youth labour force participation rate decreased globally from 58.9 to 54.7 per cent 
between 1995 and 2005, which means that today only every second young person is actively 
participating in labour markets around the world. (See table 2.3.) Youth labour force participation rates 
were highest in East Asia (67.3 per cent) and sub-Saharan Africa (65.5 per cent). The lowest rate was 
that of the Middle East and North Africa (40.0 per cent). Young women are increasingly participating 
in labour markets in the region, but the rate of increase is slowing and the female labour force 
participation rates remained at a much lower level than the corresponding male rate. At the same time, 
the labour force participation rate of men in the region dropped as more stay in the education system 
or become discouraged as a result of high unemployment and mismatches between labour supply and 
demand. Given these two offsetting trends (higher female participation and lower male participation), 
the Middle East and North Africa was the only region where participation rates remained stable over 
the last decade. The rate decreased most noticeably in East Asia, a region where labour shortages 
become more and more a risk for the booming countries in the region.30 Fortunately, the decreasing 
rate in this region is mainly the result of young people participating more, and staying longer, in 
education as opposed to youth falling out of the labour force due to discouragement (which has 
negative consequences to their future labour market integration, as discussed in section 4). Overall, 
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 For example, a recent ILO article found that the Russian Federation will need between 800,000 and 1.5 million migrant 
workers each year to compensate for its shrinking labour force and maintain economic growth. See ILO, 2006b.  
30
 See, for example, China Labour Bulletin, 2005; and Johnson and McGregor, 2006. See, in addition, ILO, 2006a. 
15 
labour force participation rates decreased during the last decade in all regions for young men, whereas 
for young women it decreased in all regions except the Middle East and North Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
Table 2.3 
Youth labour force participation rates, by sex, 1995 and 2005 
  
Total Males Females 
  
1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
World 58.9 54.7 67.2 63.0 50.1 45.9 
Developed Economies and European Union 53.6 51.8 56.9 54.0 50.1 49.6 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 47.2 41.8 52.8 48.4 41.5 35.0 
East Asia 75.2 67.3 74.6 66.3 75.7 68.4 
South East Asia and the Pacific 58.1 56.5 64.5 64.2 51.6 48.5 
South Asia 50.6 47.2 68.0 64.2 31.7 29.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 56.4 54.2 70.4 63.8 42.3 44.5 
Middle East and North Africa 40.0 40.0 56.2 54.3 23.2 25.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 68.2 65.5 76.1 73.7 60.2 57.3 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
Labour force participation rates for young women are lower than for young men, mainly 
reflecting differing cultural traditions and the lack of opportunities for women to combine work and 
family duties not only in the developing world but also in the industrialized world. The largest gaps in 
the participation of young men versus women are found in South Asia (35 percentage points) and the 
Middle East and North Africa (29 percentage points).  
The size of the labour force is also influenced by migration trends. There are no estimates on 
the share of young migrants among the 175 million global migrants31 around the world, but it is clear 
that with growing cross-border transfers of labour more and more young people will leave their homes 
in the hopes of finding work in other countries. Therefore, they have an impact on the labour markets 
in their countries as well as abroad.32 With globalization, migration will increasingly become a key 
economic, social and political issue, and detailed data will be needed to judge the impact of migration 
patterns on the labour force. 
2.2 Trends in youth employment 
Youth population growth continues to outpace employment growth  
In 2005, there were 548 million employed young women and men, an increase of 6.6 million 
from the previous year. Compared to ten years prior, there were 20.1 million more young people 
working (a change of 3.8 per cent). (See table 2.4.) At the same time, the youth population grew by 
135 million over the last ten years (a change of 13.2 per cent). (See table 2.2.) As discussed throughout 
the report, there are both positive and negative impacts associated with this discrepancy between 
population and employment growth. It is negative when the majority of the difference is explained by 
increasing numbers of unemployed youth (see discussion below) and by increased numbers of 
discouraged youth; it is positive when the majority of the difference is explained by more young 
people participating for longer periods in the educational system and if, and it’s a big “if”, decent 
employment opportunities will be available to the youth when they finally leave the education system.  
The share of youth who are employed in the youth population (the youth employment-to-
population-ratio) decreased from 51.6 to 47.3 over the last ten years. The only region where the youth 
employment-to-population ratio increased was the Middle East and North Africa, which is noteworthy 
given the tremendous growth of the youth population there of over 30 per cent during this period that 
the labour market has had to accommodate. At the same time, the region still has the lowest youth 
employment-to-population ratio with 29.7 – only every third young person has a job, largely due to 
low, but rising female employment-to-population ratios. East Asia has the highest youth employment-
to-population ratio with 62.1 but also the second biggest decrease over the last ten years of -10.6 per 
cent (behind an 11.8 per cent decrease in Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS). All other 
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 For a more detailed discussion on migration, see ILO, 2006c and 2004b. 
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regions also witnessed decreases, with the exception of the Developed Economies and European 
Union where it stayed more or less stable over the decade. 
Table 2.4 
Youth employment and youth employment-to-population ratios 
  
Youth employment (‘000s) 
Youth employment-to-
population ratio 
  1995 2004 2005 
% 
change 
1995-
2005 1995 2005 
% 
change 
1995-
2005 
World 527'886 541'347 547'976 3.8 51.6 47.3 -8.3 
Developed Economies and European Union 57'459 55'536 56'020 -2.5 45.4 45.0 -0.9 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 24'469 23'932 23'762 -2.9 38.0 33.5 -11.8 
East Asia 162'988 140'690 142'435 -12.6 69.5 62.1 -10.6 
South East Asia and the Pacific 51'461 51'424 51'763 0.6 52.8 47.5 -10.0 
South Asia 106'513 120'836 122'954 15.4 45.6 42.5 -6.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 46'016 47'933 47'653 3.6 48.3 45.2 -6.4 
Middle East and North Africa 17'876 24'243 24'649 37.9 28.5 29.7 4.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 61'105 76'754 78'739 28.9 56.2 53.7 -4.4 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
When interpreting employment-to-population ratios, it has to be keep in mind that they most 
likely mean something different in the developing world where many of the jobs are in the informal 
economy with low wages and high levels of insecurity compared to the developed world where being 
employed more often means to have a good job with a decent salary and some form of social 
protection. Given that, in addition, people in the very poor regions have to work to survive, meaning 
that they have to take any work available, it becomes clear that a high youth employment-to-
population ratio, as in sub-Saharan Africa (53.7 in 2005) could be associated with a high incidence of 
working poverty. 
2.3 Trends in youth unemployment 
Youth unemployment continues to increase in most regions of the world 
The number of young unemployed people increased by 14.8 per cent over the last ten years to 
the current high of 85 million in 2005. A closer look at the different regions shows an increase of 85.5 
per cent in South East Asia and the Pacific, 34.2 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, 23.0 per cent in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 18.2 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa, 16.1 per cent in South 
Asia, slight decreases in Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS and East Asia and a 
considerable decrease of 17.5 per cent in the Developed Economies and European Union. Between 
2004 and 2005 the only decrease was observed in the Developed Economies and European Union. All 
other regions saw increases between 0.4 per cent (South East Asia and the Pacific) and 3.1 per cent 
(Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS). The total number of unemployed youth has increased 
again over the last two years and stood at 85.3 million in 2005. (See table 2.5 and figure 2.3.) 
Table 2.5 
Total youth unemployment, 1995, 2004 and 2005  
  Youth unemployment (‘000s) 
  1995 2004 2005 
% change 
1995-2005 
World 74'302 84'546 85'278 14.8 
Developed Economies and European Union 10'281 8'997 8'481 -17.5 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 5'962 5'724 5'900 -1.0 
East Asia 13'149 11'840 12'076 -8.2 
South East Asia and the Pacific 5'242 9'687 9'727 85.5 
South Asia 11'765 13'561 13'662 16.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 7'722 9'263 9'495 23.0 
Middle East and North Africa 7'209 8'380 8'525 18.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 12'972 17'095 17'414 34.2 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
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Figure 2.3 
Global youth unemployment and youth unemployment rates, 1995-2005 
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Figure 2.4 
Youth unemployment rates, by region, 1995 and 2005 
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As seen in figures 2.3 and 2.4, worldwide the youth unemployment rate stood at 13.5 per cent 
in 2005 (compared to 6.4 per cent for the total unemployment rate and 4.5 per cent for the adult 
unemployment rate). The rate remained unchanged from 2004, but represented an increase of almost 
10 per cent above the global youth unemployment rate in 1995. The highest regional youth 
unemployment rate can be observed in the Middle East and North Africa at 25.7 per cent. Central and 
Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS had the second highest rate in the world with 19.9 per cent. Sub-
Saharan Africa’s rate was 18.1 per cent, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (16.6 per cent), 
South East Asia and the Pacific (15.8 per cent), the Developed Economies and European Union (13.1 
per cent), South Asia (10 per cent) and East Asia (7.8 per cent).  
The most dramatic increases in youth unemployment rates over the last ten years were in 
South East Asia and the Pacific where the rate increased from 9.2 to 15.8 per cent and in Latin 
America and the Caribbean where it increased from 14.4 to 16.6 per cent. In both cases, the reason for 
the increase had to do with the phases of economic crises that led to a heavy increase in 
unemployment in general, but even more so in youth unemployment. (It has been estimated that a 1 
per cent increase in adult unemployment will be matched by 2 per cent rise in unemployment among 
young people.33) Youth unemployment rates have still not recovered from this phase. The only region 
that saw a considerable decrease over the last ten years was the Developed Economies and European 
Union. This has resulted from a combination of successful youth employment strategies and a 
declining number of young people in the labour force. 
Youth are far more likely to be unemployed than adults 
In order to shed more light on the labour market situation of young people, it is interesting to 
compare their unemployment rates to those of adults: youth unemployment rates34 continued to be 
much higher than adult rates in all regions, and in almost all countries with data available with the 
exception of Germany, where the ratio in 2004 was 1.2, most likely due to the widespread use of the 
apprenticeship system for young people, and in some African nations – Lesotho with a ratio of 1.3 in 
1997 and Rwanda with a ratio of 1.4 in 1996 – where the adult and youth unemployment rates are 
almost equally high (or low, in the case of Rwanda).35 In most regions youth were nearly three times 
more likely to be unemployed than adults. The only exceptions were the Developed Economies and 
European Union, where youth unemployment was only 2.3 times higher than adult unemployment 
and, at the other end of the scale, South East Asia and the Pacific, where youth unemployment was 
more than 5 times higher than adult unemployment. (See table 2.6.) 
Table 2.6 
Ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment rates, 1995 and 2005 
  
Ratio of youth-to-adult 
unemployment rate 
  1995 2005 
World 2.8 3.0 
Developed Economies and European Union 2.3 2.3 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 2.6 2.6 
East Asia 2.9 2.8 
South East Asia and the Pacific 4.7 5.1 
South Asia 3.6 2.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.7 2.8 
Middle East and North Africa 3.0 3.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.3 3.0 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
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 UN, 2004, p. 62. 
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 Unemployment rates, as the most visible and obvious indicator for judging the situation of young people in labour markets, 
was chosen as the indicator to monitor the UN Millennium Goal to “develop and implement strategies for decent and 
productive work for youth”. As discussed in various publications the use of this indicator alone is not entirely satisfactory 
since it is only through the interpretation of a set of indicators that a holistic view of young people’s labour market 
performance can be judged. Given the definition of unemployment (see Annex 3) – a person who does not have a job but is 
actively looking for one – a high rate indicates that there are many people actively looking for work. It does not say anything 
about those who have given up on the job search (discouraged people) or people who are outside the labour force for other 
reasons.  
35
 Country level ratios are available from ILO, 2005a, table 9. 
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Box 2.1 
Why are youth unemployment rates higher than adult unemployment rates? 
 
The data shown in table 2.6 confirm that youth unemployment rates are between 2 and 6 times higher than adult 
unemployment rates depending on the region, leading us to the important questions: why are youth 
unemployment rates so much higher than adult rates? There are many likely explanations: 
• The last-in, first-out explanation. Youth are more vulnerable than adults in difficult economic times. They 
are likely to have less work experience than adults. Assuming that employers seek employees with past 
experience (and as discussed in section 5, this is the case), the youth who is entering the labour force for the 
first time will be at a disadvantage and have a harder time finding employment vis-à-vis an adult with a 
longer history of work experience. In times of surplus labour competing for a limited amount of jobs, the 
youth will be the “last in”. Similarly, because a young worker is likely to have less tenure than an adult 
worker, less company funds invested in them for training purposes and to have a temporary contract, it will 
be considered cheaper to let the younger worker go in times of economic downturns. Thus, young workers 
will be the “first out”.  
• The lack of job search expertise explanation. A young person often lacks both labour market information 
and job search experience. In many developing countries, it is only through informal placement methods – 
typically through family and friends – that a young person finds work. Beyond the word of mouth approach 
through families and friends, they simply might not know how and where to look for work. Adults, on the 
other hand, might have the possibility of finding future work through references from previous employers 
or colleagues and are more likely to know the “right” people.  
• The “shopping around” explanation. Another possibility is that youth might take longer to “shop around” 
for the right job, meaning they might wait longer to find work that suits their requirements. This, however, 
implies that a support structure, such as the family, exists to economically support them while they search 
for work. In low-income countries, this support structure does not exist for the majority of young people 
and as a result, a young person simply cannot afford to be unemployed and is likely to take whatever work 
becomes available, regardless of working conditions or whether or not the job fits his/her education or 
skills-base.  
• The lack of mobility explanation. Young people just starting out in the labour force are unlikely to have the 
financial resources to re-locate, nationally or internationally, in pursuit of work. Because many will 
continue to depend on household incomes, their job search threshold will be limited to the nearby vicinity 
of the family home.  
• The measurement explanation. As discussed in section 4 of this report, inactivity among young people is 
increasing. Conversely, the labour force of youth, and thus the denominator of the youth unemployment 
rate calculation, is shrinking in many parts of the world as more young people are enrolled in education or 
staying in the education system for longer periods of time or dropping out of the labour force as 
discouraged workers. This means that if from year X to year Y, the youth labour force in year Y is less than 
that of year X (and assuming the absolute total of unemployed youth remained constant), the youth 
unemployment rate (as number of youth unemployed/youth labour force) will be higher in year Y than in 
year X. There has not been a similar shrinkage of the adult labour force, which means that the gap between 
the youth and the adult unemployment rates would grow.  
The explanations given above – and there are likely to be even more – are a mixture of demand-side causes 
(“last in-first out” particularly) and supply-side causes (“shopping around”, etc.). None of the explanations is 
likely to explain in full the difference between youth and adult unemployment rates. What is most likely is that 
the different factors work together – and do not underestimate the influence of the shrinking youth labour force 
on the measurement – to result in the proportion of unemployed youth in the youth labour force being 
significantly higher than the proportion of unemployed adults in the adult labour force. 
An additional way to look at unemployment that helps to complete the picture is the youth 
unemployment share in total unemployment. This share was 43.7 per cent in 2005 meaning that almost 
every second unemployed person in the world is between the ages of 15 and 24 years. (See table 2.7.) 
This share has not changed considerably over the last ten years. It is a particularly troublesome 
indicator as youth only make up 25 per cent of the total working-age population. The share of youth 
unemployed among total unemployed was highest in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia and the 
Pacific, where six out of ten unemployed people were youth in 2005. The lowest share was in the 
Developed Economies and European Union at only 26.2 per cent.  
20 
Table 2.7 
Youth share in total unemployed and youth share in total working-age population,  
1995 and 2005 
  
Youth share of 
total unemployed 
(%) 
Youth share in total 
working-age 
population (%) 
  1995 2005 1995 2005 
World 46.1 43.7 26.3 25.0 
Developed Economies and European Union 29.7 26.2 17.2 15.7 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 34.2 32.9 21.6 22.1 
East Asia 47.2 39.5 24.6 20.9 
South East Asia and the Pacific 61.6 58.8 30.7 27.5 
South Asia 53.8 45.5 30.0 29.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean 49.5 44.7 30.0 26.9 
Middle East and North Africa 51.7 49.7 33.5 32.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 61.1 59.5 35.7 36.9 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
Box 2.2 
Inequalities in youth labour markets 
As has been discussed in detail in the Global Employment Trends for Youth 2004 version, young people as a 
group are not homogenous; there are certain subgroups that, in addition to being young, face other 
disadvantages that make it even harder for them to find a decent job. The data needed to find out which 
subgroups suffer most are still mainly available only for OECD countries, but anecdotal evidence shows that the 
following trends observed in these countries are replicated in the developing world: 
• In general, young women have even more difficulties finding work than young men. Even though there are 
countries and regions where unemployment is lower for young women than for young men, this often only 
means that women do not even try to find a job but leave the labour market, discouraged, altogether. When 
they do find a job it is often lower paid and in the informal economy, in unprotected low-skill jobs. (For 
more information on labour market difficulties specific to women, see Elder and Schmidt, 2004. See, also, 
ILO, 2004a.)  
• The unemployment rate tends to fall with age in most countries where data is available. The very young 
among the youth (aged 15 to 19) – typically those with the least education and certainly those with the least 
experience – have the greatest difficulties finding work, which makes it more difficult for them to gain the 
experience sought by the employers. 
• Education can be a boon or a hindrance, depending on the economic conditions of the country. In OECD 
countries, unemployment is higher among less educated young people. Higher education generally not only 
reduces the risk of unemployment, but also increases the chances of obtaining full-time employment with a 
long-term contract. In developing countries, however, where the supply of highly educated youth has 
outpaced the supply of (typically service sector) jobs to accommodate them, unemployment tends to 
increase among better educated young people. This is particularly true in the Middle East and North Africa. 
A logical consequence is often that the well-educated young people leave their countries resulting in a loss 
to the country of the investment placed in them and a brain drain. 
• Almost every country for which data are available shows higher unemployment among ethnic minorities. 
This is not always the result of lower education levels, but of discrimination by employers in the labour 
markets. 
• The poorer the parents the more likely it is that the children will be unemployed. Data for a few developed 
economies show this correlation.  
2.4 Other labour market indicators for youth 
More information on the quality of work is needed 
As discussed in the Global Employment Trends for Youth 2004 edition, the traditional 
indicators discussed above only show the tip of the iceberg concerning young people’s performance in 
labour markets. The most disturbing trend perhaps is that, among young people who do manage to find 
work, working conditions tend to be below standard. Young workers often find themselves working 
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long hours, on short-term and/or informal contracts, with low pay, little or no social protection, 
minimal training and no voice at work.36  
Obtaining an accurate picture of overall conditions of work is hampered by the paucity of data 
available, especially in a form that enables comparisons among countries. As discussed in section 5, an 
occasional survey aimed specifically at capturing more of the qualitative characteristics of youth 
labour market situations, such as the ILO school-to-work transition surveys, will help shed more light 
on the situation of young people’s working conditions. Some evidence is given in section 5 of the 
likelihood that young people rarely work with fixed term contracts, if they have any contract at all, and 
that youth wages and job satisfaction are typically low. More country level data on working conditions 
for young people is needed to widen our knowledge base so that strategies can be developed for 
ensuring decent and productive work opportunities for young men and women.  
2.5  Summary 
Figure 2.5 summarizes the situation of young people in comparison to adults, comparing the 
status within labour markets (employed, unemployed or inactive). It shows clearly that within the 
regions youth have higher shares of unemployment and inactivity and lower employment shares 
compared to adults. Regarding inactivity, the situation is less favourable in Central and Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) and CIS, South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. In all three regions this cannot 
be fully explained by high participation in education because many young people in these regions are 
neither in school nor in education, as will be discussed in section 4. The difference in unemployment 
shares between adults and young people is particularly high in South East Asia and the Pacific and 
sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, regarding employment, youth are most disadvantaged again in the regions 
of South East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa and Central and Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) and CIS.  
Figure 2.5 
Distribution of the youth and adult populations by activity status, 2005 
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Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
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 Some country level studies and cross-country studies exist which look in detail at issues such as the wages, hours of work, 
etc. of young people. See the website of the ILO Youth Employment Programme for a bibliography of country or regional 
studies of youth issues at www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/yett/publ.htm. Temporary work has also been quantified 
but only for a few European Union countries. EUROSTAT data showed that in the first quarter 2005, 40 per cent of young 
workers in the European Union were employed under temporary contracts (compared to 11 per cent of prime-age workers 
(aged 25 to 54 years). See EUROSTAT, 2005. 
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3. Trends in youth poverty and working poverty 
 
3.1 Measuring youth poverty 
Youth poverty data are strongly needed but not available 
The UN World Youth Report 2003 was one of the first publications that attempted to provide 
quantitative estimates of young people living in poverty around the world. These estimates were 
updated in the UN World Youth Report 2005.37 The UN estimated that 160 million young people were 
undernourished (a proxy for living in poverty), 208.6 million were surviving on less than a US$1 a 
day, and 515.1 million were surviving on less than US$2 a day. (See table 3.1.) 
Table 3.1 
Poverty estimates of undernourished young people (1999-2001) and young people living on 
less than US$1 a day and US$2 a day, by region, 2002 
 Undernourished 
young people 
(‘000s) 
Youth living on 
less than US$1 a 
day (‘000s) 
Youth living on 
less than US$2 a 
day (‘000s) 
South Asia 57.8 84.1 206.1 
East Asia & Pacific 38.6 46.5 150.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 39.9 60.7 102.1 
Latin American & Caribbean 10.8 11.1 27.2 
Europe & Central Asia 5.8 4.1 18.2 
Middle East & North Africa 7.1 2.0 12.1 
Total* 160.1 208.6 515.1 
* The total does not reflect exactly the sum total of the regions due to rounding. 
Note: The UN regions do not coincide exactly with the regions utilized in this report (see Annex 2 for the 
Global Employment Trends regional groupings.  
Source: UN, 2005, tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
Such a variation in the poverty estimates hints at the two challenges of quantifying youth 
poverty, which so far have not been overcome: 1) the challenge of defining the term “poverty” (see 
box 3.1); and 2) the non-availability of country level data. There is a significant lack of information on 
young people who live in poverty. Estimates on poverty are typically derived from household surveys 
and are estimated at the household level. A household is classified as poor or non-poor based on the 
cumulative income of the household members. Unequal distribution within a household is not 
considered and household members are not asked separately about their income or expenditure. This is 
the main reason why poverty data disaggregated by age, sex or any other demographic criteria are 
unavailable. 
Is there a genuine need for disaggregating data into the poor who are young and poor who are 
adults? This report argues that there is a strong necessity based on the followings reasons: 
1) Young people are frequently overlooked in national poverty reduction strategies and investing in 
youth is not often seen as essential to promoting sustainable development. Unless more is known 
about the specific situation of young people in poverty and about the nature and extent of their 
vulnerabilities it is likely that they will not be given the attention they deserve in national poverty 
reduction strategies. 
2) Young people often face a different type of poverty compared to adults. Existing forms of data 
collection concentrate on finding out about population groups trapped in chronic poverty while 
young people are more likely to be experiencing a more dynamic form of poverty. One researcher 
found that “The transition from childhood to adulthood involves confronting and overcoming a 
number of uncertainties. Moreover, young people potentially face a large number of changes at the 
same time, thus compounding their difficulties. These obstacles are encountered in relation to 
work, living arrangements and personal relationships. Identifying the uncertain outcomes young 
people or subgroups of young people are facing is the first step in devising ways to improve levels 
of social protection.”38 Therefore, recognizing that youth in poverty face unique obstacles implies 
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 UN, 2005. See especially, Part I: Youth in The Global Economy: Young people living in poverty. The UN World Youth 
Report 2003 is available on website: www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/wyr03.htm.  
38
 Curtain, 2004.  
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that poverty reduction strategies for youth might necessitate different approaches than those for 
adults. 
If one accepts that poverty is a multi-faceted and changeable state, then collecting data on 
poverty becomes a more complex task that requires going beyond the usual aggregate cross-sectional 
data to longitudinal collection of information about the same individuals or same group’s experiences 
of poverty. 
Box 3.1 
What is poverty? 
Measuring poverty is not an easy task. First one has to work through numerous questions such as those that 
follow and then decide upon the ultimate definition of poverty to be measured:  
• Is poverty merely a lack of income or should it include other dimensions related to human survival, such as 
access to good sanitation, health care and education opportunities?  
• If poverty is defined as low income, what is the best way of measuring the income of individuals and 
households?  
• If poverty is defined more broadly, what measures are appropriate to capture access to needed services?  
• In relation to the poverty measures used, should the reference point be to some absolute level or is poverty 
a relative concept that needs to be related to the standard of living of the society in which the poor live?  
It is now widely accepted that poverty entails multiple dimensions of deprivation and therefore refers to more 
than lack of income. The UN Millennium Development Goals adopted a broader view and therefore cover 
numerous dimensions of poverty (hunger, health and income). Amartya Sen was one of the first economists 
who argued that poverty is best understood as various forms of “unfreedom” that prevent people from realizing 
and enlarging their capabilities. This conception of poverty takes into consideration both civil and political 
liberties and economic and social rights as primary goals of development and the principal means of progress. 
Sen’s concept of poverty also acknowledges that personal experiences of poverty can change according to 
circumstances. Such a dynamic view of poverty is often more applicable to young people due to the obstacles 
most of them face in seeking to achieve adult status. 
Sources: Curtain, 2004; Sen, 2000. 
 
Given this lack of age-disaggregated data and the difficulties of a defining poverty, how did 
the UN calculate the headcount of young people in extreme poverty? They used a simple but logical 
method of taking the absolute number of poor people (the World Bank estimates of persons living on 
less than US$1 a day) as the basis. They then calculated the proportion of people in a country below 
the poverty line and applied this proportion to the population of the youth (15 to 24) age group to 
generate the number of young people below the poverty line. For countries for which there are no 
poverty measures, estimates of young people in poverty were made by matching them with the closest 
country – in terms of several indicators – with an available poverty measure.39  
This methodology which was first applied in the 2003 UN report was again used for the 2005 
report even though the authors caution that the primary assumption behind the model – that the 
distribution of poverty among young people follows the same pattern as the distribution among the 
total population – has not yet been proven. The detailed results given by the UN youth poverty 
estimates are shown in table 3.1. According to these estimates one in five young people in the world 
(19.3 per cent of the world’s youth population of 1.1 billion) are living in extreme poverty. Using the 
US$2 a day measure, nearly half of all young people can be categorized as living in poverty (47.6 per 
cent of the youth population). 
3.2 Going beyond youth poverty to youth working poverty 
Youth working poverty is a key challenge for development 
Many young people in the world experience poverty despite the fact that they are working; 
these are the youth “working poor” (see box 3.2). A primary cause of their inability to escape from 
poverty is the type of work they do and the inability to find more decent and productive work. The 
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 For details see Curtain, 2004, and UN, 2003 and 2005. 
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poor are most likely to be found working in jobs under poor conditions with long hours, low wages, 
lack of contract (and thus security), and often in the informal economy. Similar to absolute poverty 
among youth, there is very little published evidence to show the incidence of working poverty for 
youth. At the same time it is an undeniable tenet – and now one that is recognized within the UN40 as 
well as other international organizations and governments – that it is only through decent employment 
opportunities that young people get the chance to work themselves out of poverty. Youth employment 
is therefore an integral part of the UN Millennium Declaration, both as an important target in its own 
right in the MDG 8 and as a key contribution to meeting other MDGs.41 
Box 3.2 
What is working poverty? 
Working long hours for low wages under poor conditions and with no social security or any voice is the exact 
opposite of what the ILO would call “decent work”. Quantifying the extent of non-decent work in order to show 
the dimension of the problem remains one of the ILO’s greatest challenges. The ILO developed the concept of 
working poverty as a means of quantifying the income-related aspects of decent work, under the assumption 
that people who work but do not earn enough to lift themselves and their families above the US$1 or 2 a day 
poverty line are not engaged in decent and productive work. There is a strong possibility that people who 
constitute the working poor work in the informal economy (whereas the reverse is not necessarily the case, 
i.e. people who work in the informal economy are not necessarily working poor). For this reason, in the absence 
of better data, the estimate of working poor can also be interpreted as a rough approximation of people who 
work in the informal economy with very low earnings. 
It is important to note that, by definition, a person is counted as working poor only if that person is unable to lift 
himself or herself and his or her family above the poverty threshold. This means that someone who earns only 
50 cents a day would not be considered as working poor if another member of their household earns enough to 
make the cumulative household income more than US$1 a day per head. Conversely, somebody might earn as 
much as, for example, US$5 a day but with a family comprising, say, 10 members (9 of them not working) each 
member would be living on less than US$1 a day. Such a person would be counted as working poor. The ILO 
recognizes that there are disadvantages to relying on household level income rather than individual income such 
as earnings from work – for example, if income is not equitably distributed within a household, certain 
household members could be living in conditions of poverty while others do not. However, in the absence of 
individual level income data over time, the household income serves as the only available approximation of 
individual poverty. In addition, given that in the developing world, income tends to be pooled within a 
household, the ILO feels that the methodology used to determine the working poor is a viable one. A final 
advantage to the ILO methodology is that by including the whole household in the concept of working poverty, 
one ensures that a rich young person in the developing world who has just started working life and does so 
without remuneration, in order to gain work experience, is not considered as working poor. 
Source: ILO, 2005b, box 1.1. 
Given the lack of data and the continued demand for more detailed information about young 
people who work but still live in poverty, a careful methodology was used in this report to generate a 
rough estimate of the size of the young working poor. As there are no poverty data available by age 
(see discussion above), the only method at this time to produce such an estimate was to combine 
employment data from the ILO Global Employment Trends Model with the overall working poor data 
from the ILO Working Poverty Model (see box 2 for details). Both models have been verified by a 
large group of specialists and have been used for an extended period of time in various ILO reports. 
Based on the regional estimates generated from the models, the estimation methodology used to 
approximate the number of young people in working poverty was carried out as follows: 
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 ECOSOC High-level Segment: Ministerial Declaration, 5 July 2006, E/2006/L.8. 
41
 Five of the Goals may be identified as referring directly to youth because they relate to issues primarily associated with 
young people, including educational attainment, gender balance in education, improved maternal health, combating 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, and decent employment opportunities for youth. In addition 
greater investment in improving adolescent health and education will not only reduce poverty, but also bring countries closer 
to achieving the targets for two other MDGs. Overall improvements in adolescent health will reduce the incidence of high-
risk pregnancies among undernourished teenagers and thereby contribute significantly to reducing child mortality, the 
objective of Goal 4. Higher educational levels and improved nutrition among young mothers will help reduce the prevalence 
of underweight children below five years of age (one of the indicators for Goal 1), which will contribute substantially to the 
eradication of hunger, as called for in Goal 1 (UN, 2005, p. 25). 
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1. The youth share in total employment was calculated. 
2. The youth share in total labour force was calculated. 
3. As it is not known whether poor people are more likely to imitate the overall employment 
behaviour of the total population, in which case the employment share would be applied to the 
poverty figures, or are more likely to imitate the overall labour force behaviour of the 
population, in which case the labour force share would be applied to the poverty figures, the 
more cautious approach was taken by calculating the average of the result of steps 1 and 2.42 
4. The average of the youth share in total employment and the youth share in total labour force 
was applied to the total regional working poor (US$1 and US$2 a day levels) to get a total 
number of youth working poor living below these levels.  
5. The result of step 4 was divided by total youth employment to get a youth working poverty 
rate. 
We are, of course, aware of difficulties with this estimation technique that stem from the 
strong assumption made in step 4, namely that youth have the same poverty pattern as the overall 
population. One valid argument against the premise is that there are specificities of the age group that 
would warrant their receipt of lower pay. Numerous countries, for example, have implemented 
minimum wages for young people that are lower than those of adults.43 However, from the point of 
view of this estimation methodology, whether or not youth receive lower pay than other groups is 
irrelevant since the absolute poverty measure utilized is one based on cumulative household income. If 
an adult lives in a poor household, s/he is counted as poor; the same as a young person living in a poor 
household would be. If, however, adults are likely to head up smaller households with fewer 
breadwinners, then it is true that poverty might be slightly skewed toward adults. Nonetheless, in the 
absence of better information, the estimation technique applied here serves as a best currently 
available estimate of youth working poor.  
As a precaution, to make sure that the estimates are realistic, we made the same calculations 
using the model-generated country level data (technique 2) and also applying aggregate employment 
and labour force shares (average) to the UN youth poverty estimates in table 3.1 (technique 3) to 
crosscheck. The global and regional aggregates of youth working poor generated through each 
technique are similar enough to add confidence to the numbers ultimately shown in table 3.2. We also 
checked the results as best we could against the anecdotal evidence we have from countries and 
experts on each of the regions. If anything, the results are more likely to give an underestimation than 
an overestimation of the problem of working poverty among youth for the following reasons:  
1. As was stated in the UN report and other publications, it is likely that the share of poor among 
young people is even higher than among the overall population, given young people’s special 
vulnerabilities.  
2. There are strong reasons to believe, as mentioned above, that among young poor people the 
employment share is closer to the labour force share of the total population, meaning less 
unemployment exists than among the total population as almost all poor persons in the youth 
labour force have to work to survive – especially those who have just left their home or are 
about to build up their own family. 
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 Research done on this question has so far brought mixed results. In some countries it seems that the poor have similar 
employment shares meaning that if in the total working age population 10 per cent have a job, it is the same among the poor 
in this country. In other countries it was found that the share of people working is much higher among the poor, sometimes 
even higher than the labour force share in working age population. Thereby taking the average is the best guess possible until 
there is more data available. This is also the approach taken in the ILO Working Poverty Model (see box 2 for more 
information). 
43
 For more information on countries that set lower minimum wages for young workers and the arguments for doing so, see 
Eyraud and Saget, 2005, pp. 48-62.  
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Table 3.2 
US$1 and US$2 a day working poverty among youth, total numbers  
and youth working poverty rates* 
  
Youth US$1 a day working 
poor ('000s) 
Youth US$2 a day working 
poor ('000s) 
  
1995 2004 2005 1995 2004 2005 
World 155'894 127'350 124'534 329'678 309'178 308'450 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 1'887 821 679 8'494 4'169 3'481 
East Asia 40'771 20'844 19'115 106'150 69'305 67'121 
South East Asia and the Pacific 9'977 6'753 6'605 35'814 31'901 31'592 
South Asia 60'266 46'923 45'535 99'761 109'962 111'369 
Latin America and the Caribbean 6'311 6'620 6'349 17'903 17'080 16'671 
Middle East and North Africa 648 841 839 8'332 9'672 9'660 
Sub-Saharan Africa 36'034 44'548 45'413 53'226 67'090 68'557 
  
Youth US$1 a day working 
poverty rate (%) 
Youth US$2a day working 
poverty rate (%) 
  
1995 2004 2005 1995 2004 2005 
World 29.5 23.5 22.7 62.5 57.1 56.3 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 7.7 3.4 2.9 34.7 17.4 14.6 
East Asia 25.0 14.8 13.4 65.1 49.3 47.1 
South East Asia and the Pacific 19.4 13.1 12.8 69.6 62.0 61.0 
South Asia 56.6 38.8 37.0 93.7 91.0 90.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean 13.7 13.8 13.3 38.9 35.6 35.0 
Middle East and North Africa 3.6 3.5 3.4 46.6 39.9 39.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 59.0 58.0 57.7 87.1 87.4 87.1 
* Youth working poverty rate = share of young working poor in total youth employment  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the results of the ILO, Global Employment Trends Model, 2006 and the ILO, 
Working Poverty Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
 
The results show that approximately 125 million young people or one in five who are working 
could be counted as US$1 a day working poor. In other words, every fifth young person in the world 
works but remains in a household living in extreme poverty. This is less than ten years ago, but this 
“success” has to be interpreted carefully as, once again, part of the result has to do with the fact both 
the labour force participation rates and employment-to-population ratios of young people are 
shrinking. In addition, it is very likely that some young people simply moved just above the threshold 
of US$1 a day and now belong to the group of US$2 a day working poor.  
The situation is most alarming for sub-Saharan Africa, the only region that has seen a sharp 
and continuous increase of the total number of youth working poor at the US$1 a day level (from 36 
million to 45 million between 1995 and 2005). Even though the working poverty rate has decreased 
slightly over the last ten years – which is mostly the result of higher youth shares in the working-age 
population as a result of demographic shifts – still almost six out of ten young people who are working 
are still living in extreme poverty. Extreme working poverty is also still a big problem in South Asia, 
where almost four out of ten young people work but remain poor. But at least the long-term trend has 
shown some improvement in the region; ten years ago, almost six out of ten young working people 
were US$1 a day working poor, which was almost as much as in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Youth US$2 a day working poverty has also decreased over the last ten years in the world as a 
whole (from 330 million to 309 million), but still every second young person with a job has to survive 
with his family on less than US$2 a day per family member. The decrease has been most considerable 
in Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS and in East Asia. In South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa only one out of ten young people earn enough to lift themselves together with their families 
above the threshold of US$2 a day. 
 
3.3. The need to know more about poverty 
Poverty and employment are strongly linked. As long as poverty remains a major barrier to 
education, children from poor households will not get the education needed to escape the poverty trap 
and they will continue to struggle in work that is less productive and lack the most basic elements of 
decent employment. They will in turn fail to lift themselves and their families out of poverty 
(assuming demand is higher for better educated youth). Therefore, if successful strategies are to be 
developed that aim to help young people escape from poverty then more information is needed about 
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youth poverty in general and also about the labour market characteristics of young people in poverty. 
Without better information, it is likely that – as in the past – young people will be frequently 
overlooked in national poverty reduction strategies. It will require a careful assessment to show, 
definitively, that investing in youth is an essential part in the promotion of sustainable development. 
Box 3.3 
Young girls and young refugees have the lowest chances to escape poverty 
 
Within the group of young people some subgroups have an even higher risk of remaining in poverty, whether 
they work or not. Two particularly disadvantaged groups are young girls and refugees.  
When poor parents need to make a choice about which of their children should receive an education, girls tend 
to be excluded first. The literacy gap between young men and young women appears to be widening in Africa 
and Asia; the greatest gender inequalities are found in North Africa and Western Asia, where educationally-
deprived girls outnumber the corresponding groups of boys by almost three to one. Countries in East Asia and 
the Pacific have come close to achieving gender parity in access to education, while in Latin America and the 
Caribbean there appears to be a slight bias against boys. (UN, 2005, p. 14.) Without an education chances of 
getting a decent job are almost zero. That is why young girls in the developing world have little option but to 
get married which, given their poor family background, is most likely just a move from one poor household to 
the next. UNDP estimates that 70 per cent of the 1.3 billion people living in extreme poverty and suffering from 
hunger are women. (UNDP, 1995.) There is no reason to think that this share would be lower among young 
women.  
Another group of young people with little prospect of a decent future life are young refugees, even if before 
becoming a refugee they were not poor. In general, about 35 out of 100 refugees are young people between the 
ages of 12 and 24. These are the people outside of the “development mainstream”, meaning that the 
governments and donor development projects generally do not reach them. Very little is known about their 
chances to escape poverty but, as they have to start from nothing, it is very likely that they become trapped in 
the poverty cycle. (See UN, 2006.) 
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4. Explaining youth inactivity and labour market vulnerability 
 
4.1  Explaining youth inactivity 
Most young people today enter the labour market  
at a later age than their parents 
According to the international standards for classification of the economically active 
population, the young persons who are neither employed nor unemployed (the sum of which equal the 
labour force) comprise the residual group of young persons who are not in the labour force, or, 
equivalently, (currently) economically inactive youth.44 Given that, voluntary or not, more young 
persons today are postponing their entry into the labour market until they are beyond the age of 25, 
after which they no longer qualify as “youth” according to the international standard, youth inactivity 
rates have increased. As a matter of fact all regions showed an increase in the youth inactivity rate 
over the ten year period (see table 4.1).  
Globally, the youth inactivity rate rose from 41.1 to 45.3 per cent between 1995 and 2005. 
Youth inactivity continues to be highest in the Middle East and North Africa and in South Asia, which 
mimics the trend of the overall (aged 15 years and over) inactivity rates and can be largely explained 
by the low levels of female labour force participation due to cultural and socio-economic constraints in 
many countries in the regions. It is in all regions, however, and not just those where female work 
outside of the household is traditionally constrained, where young females make up the greater share 
of the total inactive youth population. The global female share of total inactive youth in 2005 was 58.2 
per cent. East Asia was the only exception.  
Table 4.1 
Youth inactivity and inactivity rates (1995 and 2005) and female share  
of total inactive youth (2005) 
 Inactive youth 
(‘000s) 
Youth inactivity rate (%) 
  1995 2005 
Female 
share of 
inactive 
youth - 
2005 (%) 
1995 2005 
% 
change 
1995-
2005 
World 421'040 524'756 58.2 41.1 45.3 10.1 
Developed Economies and European Union 58'694 59'902 51.2 46.4 48.2 3.7 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 34'022 41'279 55.1 52.8 58.2 10.2 
East Asia 58'227 74'978 46.2 24.8 32.7 31.5 
South East Asia and the Pacific 40'845 47'419 58.4 41.9 43.5 4.0 
South Asia 115'540 152'544 65.0 49.4 52.8 6.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 41'565 48'319 60.1 43.6 45.8 5.0 
Middle East and North Africa 37'566 49'741 61.1 60.0 60.0 0.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 34'582 50'573 61.6 31.8 34.5 8.3 
Source: Global Employment Trends (GET) Model, 2006 (see box 2 for more information). 
 
The explanations behind the patterns in youth inactivity are likely to vary from region to 
region, and even from country to country, as will the implication of the trend to the interpretation of 
the labour market prospects of young people. The key question we are seeking to answer is: What does 
shrinking youth labour force participation, and hence growing youth inactivity,45 mean in terms of the 
well-being of the youth population? In order to answer it, we need first to look at who the inactive 
youths are, and second, why they are inactive.  
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 Resolution concerning statistics of the economically active population, employment, unemployment and 
underemployment, adopted by the 13th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, Geneva, October 1982; 
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/res/ecacpop.pdf.  
45
 Growing inactivity among youth indicates a shrinking youth labour force (active population) since the one is the inverse of 
the other: A person is either active or inactive; mathematically this means 100 minus the labour force participation rate equals 
the inactivity rate, and vice versa. 
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Who is inactive and why? 
Although we are in danger of over-generalizing when trying to identify common 
characteristics of a globally inactive youth population, we can at least say that there is a greater 
likelihood of a young person in a higher income country being inactive than one from a lower income 
country.46 Figure 4.1 shows the correlation between a country’s income level (measured by GDP per 
capita at PPP in 2005) and the youth inactivity rate of the country; the trendline indicates that the two 
variables are positively related so that lower income levels correspond to lower levels of inactivity of 
the youth population while a higher income level corresponds to a higher youth inactivity rate. We can 
draw the tentative conclusion, therefore, that income level is one determinant of the inactivity level of 
youth in a country. 
Inactivity is not an option for youth in poor countries 
The correlation relates to the notion that in low-income economies, many young people do not 
have the option of staying in education due to lack of education infrastructure or high education fees 
(relative to the family income). In addition, opportunity costs of doing so are too high, which means 
that it does not always pay off to stay in school. Finally young people in poor countries are very likely 
to take on any job in order to maintain at least a subsistence level of support for her/himself and 
her/his family. Labour force participation of young people in poor households is not a matter of 
choice, but of necessity.  
Figure 4.1 
Youth inactivity rates and GDP per capita (at PPP), 2005 
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Source: ILO, 2005a, table 13 (youth inactivity rates) and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
online database (GDP per capita). 
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 We recognize that a country’s level of overall GDP per capita says nothing about the distribution of wealth within the 
country and therefore mutes the evidence for an income-based explanation of youth inactivity. What would be necessary to 
substantiate the claim would be household level income data that could be analyzed against the current activity status of 
household members. Lacking such information the best we can do to provide further evidence is compare inactivity rates 
within poorer districts of a country with those of higher income districts. Looking at evidence from one country – Sri Lanka – 
we can confirm that in the poorest province (Uva), where more than a third of the population lived below the national poverty 
line in 2002, the inactivity rate was approximately 27 per cent less than that of the wealthiest province (Western). The 
difference was even more striking for poor women. Women in the poorest province were 32 per cent less likely to work or 
seek work than women in the wealthiest province; yet they remain poor despite their efforts to earn a living. (Sources: 
Department of Census and Statistics, 2002a and 2002b.  
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Reasons for inactivity 
As for the question of why a young person would be neither working nor looking for work, 
and what that means to her/his welfare and future development, the answer depends on what the young 
person is doing as an alternative. A person could be inactive for any of the following reasons: (a) is 
attending school (and not working or looking for work while in school); (b) is engaged in household 
duties such as caring for children or other household members; (c) is retired; (d) is disabled or ill; or 
(e) other reasons including not knowing how/where to look for work or believing there is no work 
available (the “discouraged worker”).  
Increased participation in education is a main factor in explaining decreased economic activity 
among youth, especially in developed economies and Asian countries  
There is not a sufficient amount of country-level data to allow us to make general statements 
on the distribution of inactive youth for the reasons listed above at the regional or global levels. We do 
know, however, that education enrolment is rising around the world; more young people are going to 
school and staying there for longer periods of time. Therefore, a safe assumption is that most of the 
increase in youth inactivity rates can be explained by an increasing number of young people staying in 
full-time education. This is confirmed by a review of how youth inactivity rates moved in relation to 
gross tertiary-level enrolment ratios47 over time in countries with available data (see figure 4.2). 
Although exceptions exist, there is a general trend for youth inactivity rates to increase as participation 
in higher level education increased (meaning the majority of country level records fall in the upper 
right quadrant of the chart).48  
Figure 4.2 
Percentage change in gross enrolment ratios at the tertiary level and the percentage change in 
youth inactivity rates, by region, 1990-2002 
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Note: earliest to latest year data are between the years of 1990 and 2002 and differ from country to country.  
Source: ILO, 2005, table 13 (youth inactivity rates) and World Bank, 2005, online database, table 2.11 (gross enrolment ratios – 
tertiary). 
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 Gross tertiary level enrolment ratio is defined as the ratio over time of the total persons enrolled in higher education 
(tertiary level), regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the higher level of 
education in the country. The source of the information is the World Bank, 2005, table 2.11.  
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 There was also a positive relationship between youth inactivity rates and participation ratios at the secondary education 
level.  
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The analysis of data shown in figure 4.2 also points to other interesting trends, such as: 
• There is a strong positive correlation between the two variables – tertiary enrolment and youth 
inactivity rates – in the regions of the Developed Economies and the European Union, East Asia, 
South East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia. This can be interpreted to mean that, in these 
regions, the decreased economic activity of youth can be “mostly” explained by the fact that 
more young people are opting to stay in education rather than join the work force.  
• In the regions of Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS and Latin America and the 
Caribbean there is a positive, but much weaker correlation between the two variables, meaning 
that education alone cannot explain the decision of young people to postpone their entry to the 
world of work. In fact, four countries in the CIS region – Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, saw a decrease in the enrolment ratio of higher education while 
youth inactivity rates increased, making it even more clear that the reason for inactivity among 
youth lies elsewhere. It is in these countries that young people tend to become “discouraged” 
and fall outside of the labour force because they feel that no job opportunities are available 
(reason “e” above). Discouragement is discussed in greater detail below. 
• The only region where the trend was negative – enrolment increased while youth inactivity 
decreased – was the Middle East and North Africa. In countries in this region, more young 
people are entering full time education, but the overall trend in the economic activity of young 
people is dominated by the almost 10 per cent increase – from 23 to 25 per cent between 1995 
and 2005 – in the labour force participation of young women (and inversely, a decrease in the 
inactivity rate from 77 to 75 per cent). The weakness of the correlation in the region of Latin 
America and the Caribbean can also be explained in part by the slight increase in the labour 
force participation of young women there.  
• The largest increases in tertiary enrolment ratios were seen in South East Asia and specifically 
in Cambodia and Viet Nam. There were also significant increases in higher education 
participation in some sub-Saharan African countries, although the enrolment ratios remain very 
low – generally at less than 5. The gross tertiary enrolment ratio also increased more than 300 
per cent in China between 1990 and 2001 from 3 to 13.   
• Declining enrolment in higher education was most common in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) and CIS region and in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the sub-Saharan African countries 
represented in the lower left quadrant (where negative growth was seen in both the youth 
inactivity rate and the enrolment ratio) – Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe and Zimbabwe – underwent some form of civil 
unrest over the period, which likely meant that young people were more concerned with security 
and their livelihood of themselves and their families than furthering their education. A more 
likely reason for declining educational enrolment, however, was that poverty prevented more 
families from supporting their child’s education. 
Discouragement as the most “damaging” reason for inactivity 
A person who is “discouraged” is one who is classified as currently inactive for a reason 
implying that s/he felt that undertaking a job search would be a futile effort. Specifically, the youth 
might respond that s/he did not seek work because s/he has insufficient education and/or skills to get a 
job, that no suitable work was available locally, or that s/he did not know where to look for work.49 A 
discouraged youth – just like a young person who is unemployed for a long period of time – is 
vulnerable to facing a difficulty process of reintegrating into the labour force (see full definition of 
“vulnerable” below) and is in danger of feeling useless and of becoming alienated from society. For 
the economy, the presence of discouraged workers represents a waste of human resources and 
productive potential.  
Few countries quantify discouragement, therefore, our knowledge on the extent of the problem 
is more anecdotal than factual. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) publishes data for its member States, but given that the OECD represents mostly developed 
economies, discouragement among youth is likely to be less of a problem and likely to appear for 
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 For a more technical discussion of discouraged workers and the complexities of measurement, see ILO, 1990, pp. 107-08. 
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different reasons than in the developing world. Among OECD countries, the highest share of 
discouraged youth in the youth population was still quite low at 5.7 per cent in Sweden in 2004 
followed by Italy with 2.0 per cent. All other countries showed incidences of discouragement among 
youth at less than 1 per cent.50  
Young people are more likely to withdraw from the labour market and not even look for work 
in countries of stagnant or negative growth – countries in the region of Central and Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) and CIS, for example. In countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, 
which are struggling to recover from years of conflict, young people must compete with a large pool 
of unemployed adults for a very limited amount of job vacancies. Many give up and remain idle. 
Others “hide” in the education system, postponing graduation in the hope that eventually the economy 
will recover to a point where jobs will be available to them. In these countries, discouragement among 
youth is not a small phenomenon, although its exact share is difficult to measure. 
The share of youth who are neither in education nor employment (NEET) is a good  
measure of the non-utilized labour potential of the youth population  
We may not have good data on the number of discouraged youth, but we are seeing more and 
more data produced on the so-called NEET rate, a measure of the percentage of youth who are neither 
in education nor employment in the youth population. This indicator captures young people who are 
inactive for reasons other than participation in education (thus including the discouraged worker but 
also persons who are inactive for other reasons such as inactivity due to disability or due to 
engagement in household duties) and youth who are unemployed and is therefore a better proxy for 
capturing the non-utilized labour potential of the youth population. Figure 4.3 presents the available 
data on the youth NEET rate and confirms a high share of NEET youth in the Central and Eastern 
Europe region. The youth NEET rate was, on average, 33.6 per cent in the region, compared with 27.0 
per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, 21.0 per cent in Central and South America and 13.4 per cent in the 
Developed Economies and European Union. In countries with data available by sex, there is evidence 
of a greater likelihood of idleness among young women than young men, with particularly large 
gender differences seen in Central and South America and sub-Saharan Africa (16 percentage point 
gaps in both regions).  
It is important to keep in mind that this measure contains both unemployed non-student youth 
and youth who are inactive for reasons other than educational enrolment, including discouragement 
(i.e. inactive non-students). Ideally, one would be able to isolate each subset from the number of youth 
classified as NEET to see which constitutes the bulk of the non-utilized labour potential measure. 
Unfortunately, the detailed information from which to disaggregate the NEET total is available only 
for the OECD group of countries to date. For the OECD region, however, we are able to conclude that 
the majority of youth who were neither in education nor employment were inactive non-students (57 
per cent, on average) while the remainder were unemployed non-students (43 per cent). The larger 
NEET shares for young women than young men in the regions of Central and South America and sub-
Saharan Africa can probably be explained by the fact that, due to cultural and economic constraints, 
young women in the regions oftentimes fall outside of the labour force because they are required to 
tend to household duties. This would result in a larger number of inactive non-students for young 
females than young males. Also, enrolment rates are likely to be lower for young females than young 
males meaning that more young males would be in education and thus not counted as NEET. 
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 Data on discouraged workers are from the OECD Statistics online database available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/default.aspx; data extracted 2006/07/14.   
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Figure 4.3 
Share of youth neither in employment nor education (NEET) in total youth population,  
regional averages51 
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Sources: Developed Economies and European Union: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD Statistics online 
database available at http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/default.aspx; Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS: data 
from Kolev and Saget, 2005, except for Turkey, which is authors’ calculation based on data from OECD Statistics; 
Central and South America: data from Diez de Medina, 2001, except for Mexico, which is authors’ calculation based on 
data from OECD Statistics, and Peru which comes from Chacaltana, 2006; sub-Saharan Africa: data from Guarcello, 
2005 and UN-Habitat, Global Urban Observatory, June 2004.  
4.2  Explaining labour market vulnerability among youth 
Who are the most vulnerable youth? 
For the purpose of this report, the ILO defines a vulnerable youth as one whom, due to socio-
economic (and sometimes political) circumstances, is vulnerable to facing difficulties in the process of 
labour market integration or, if working, is vulnerable to working under inadequate conditions. As a 
result of labour-related vulnerabilities, young men and women are weaker not only as workers, but 
also as citizens and agents of change; they cannot exercise their rights as citizens because they have 
limited or no rights as workers; they cannot provide a better future to their children and dependants 
because they do not earn enough to lift themselves and their families out of poverty; they cannot hope 
for income security as they age since they do not have access to social protection. Labour market 
vulnerability among youth may lead to their loss of self-esteem, to social exclusion, to 
impoverishment, to idleness and potential attraction to illicit activities, and finally to feelings of 
frustration with their situation and to directing their frustration on the society that created it. The 
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 Average of 24 countries in the Developed Economies and European Union region (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States) in the latest year of 
data availability (2003, except for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States, 2002, and New Zealand, 2001). 
Central and Eastern Europe is an average of six countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and 
Turkey) in c. 2001, except for Turkey, 2003. Central and South America is average of 16 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela) in years 1997 or 1998, except for Peru, 2002 and Mexico, 2003. Sub-Saharan Africa is average of 23 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in an undefined year.  
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danger is that with a buildup of grievances, vulnerable youth lose faith in the system of governance 
that they feel has failed to live up to their expectations. 
How does one identify the most vulnerable youth, especially given that the definition given 
spans across multiple activity statuses? For identifying the youth most vulnerable to being unable to 
fully integrate into the labour market without assistance, the indicator of youth who are neither in 
education nor employment is a good place to start. These are the young people who, due to a lack of 
economic demand, are suffering most from a deficit of decent work opportunities. As a result, they 
either look for work or simply bide their time hoping that conditions will eventually improve. As 
much as one-third of the youth population in struggling post-conflict economies such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia is in danger of being lost in a system where they are unable to contribute to 
their own well-being, let alone to the well-being of their families or society as a whole. Likewise, in 
Africa there are millions of alienated young people, particularly in desperately poor urban areas, 
whose lives are defined simply as “enduring”.52  
It is important to broaden the vulnerability spectrum to include also young people who are 
working because, as stated in section 2.2, the welfare of young people depends on more than simply 
having work. It is the quality of work that matters. A young person who is in an inadequate 
employment situation – whether defined in terms of wage, hours, job security or social protection – is 
also susceptible to poverty, to dissatisfaction, to alienation, etc. With regards to figure 1, we discuss 
the concepts of “underemployment” versus “full employment”. Youth who work under unsatisfactory 
conditions, as determined by any number of qualititative characteristics (hours, inadequate 
remuneration, poor use of ones skills, lack of security, lack of benefits, to name a few) fall under the 
very broad categorization of “underemployed youth”53 and, therefore, constitute a portion of the young 
people who fall within the decent work opportunity deficit. Additional information, disaggregated by 
age, at the country level is needed before the conditions of work aspects of vulnerability could be 
estimated at the global or regional level. The only quantifiable approximation we have to date is that 
of the working poor youth – 125 million youth at the US$1 a day level in 2005, or 22.7 per cent of 
employed youth – who due to inadequate remunerative returns to their labour would easily qualify as 
youth who lack decent work opportunities.  
Figure 4.4 attempts to place the risk of labour market vulnerability among young people in a 
spectrum based on the current activity of the youth and the potential for future labour market 
integration. Chances of future integration into the labour market (without intervention) increases from 
left to right so that a young person whose main reason for inactivity was because s/he was attending 
school or training full time is more likely to enter the labour market in the future than a young person 
who is no longer seeking work because s/he felt “discouraged”. The former person’s labour market 
vulnerability, therefore, could be rated as “low”. Likewise, (re)integration into the labour market 
becomes more difficult as the period of unemployment lengthens due to the jobseeker’s eventual loss 
of skills, employers’ biases and the increasing likelihood of the young person becoming 
“discouraged”. Therefore, the longer the spell of unemployment, the more vulnerable the youth.   
Inactivity is not only a waste of potential but also a risk to societies. It should be top priority 
for countries to concentrate not only on the unemployed youth but also on the involuntarily inactive – 
especially the discouraged – youth. In the poorest countries, it must be an important role of national 
policies and programmes, backed by international aid, to reach the most vulnerable youth and to bring 
them back into the fold of a civil society that can benefit from their participation. To explain inactivity 
even further it is necessary to get more detailed information on its causes because it is only based on 
an analysis of relevant data that effective programmes and policies can be designed. 
 
                                                 
52
 Sommers, 2003, p. 36. 
53
 It is worth repeating that time-related underemployment – underemployment measured as a deficiency of working hours – 
remains the only formulation of underemployment that has been agreed on and properly defined within the international 
community of labour statisticians. See the Resolution concerning the measurement of underemployment and inadequate 
employment situations, adopted by the 16th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, Geneva, 1998; website: 
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/res/underemp.pdf. 
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Figure 4.4 
Determining vulnerability among young people 
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5. The school-to-work transition 
 
5.1  What does “transition” mean?  
The inevitable transition from youth to adulthood encompasses many “firsts” for individuals – 
first job experience and first wage, first departure from education and from the family household, first 
vote, first struggle for self-dependence, etc. Of course there are many different variations within the 
life phase from youth to adulthood; some young people may never join the labour force or some may 
never work for a wage; some will never set up an individual household, but will remain instead within 
a larger family compound; some may have started working at a very early age (child labourers); others 
might already have children to look after. In the report on “Working out of poverty”, the ILO Director-
General emphasized that “identifying the key stages of life when people are vulnerable to falling into 
poverty is the starting point for understanding the dynamics of life and work of poor communities”.54 
The transition from youth to adulthood is one of these “key stages” that can determine a person’s 
chance of escaping poverty, and as such, warrants special attention. But of course there is no one path 
to adulthood and the task of prescribing paths, with all the milestones, from region to region or 
country to country is a risky business given the variety of culturally-driven beliefs of what adulthood 
means and the vastly different economic constraints and institutional barriers that might block the 
youth’s path in getting there.  
It is beyond the scope of this report to touch on all the possible influences in the life course of 
young men and women into adulthood. Instead, we focus on the transition from school to work, which 
we would argue is probably the most significant for determining the economic (and social) well-being 
of the individual and, if taken collectively, for influencing the level of development of the country. 
5.2  The ILO concept of the school-to-work transition: measuring the transition to 
“decent work” 
Two things are of interest from the ILO’s point of view: first, how do we quantify and explain 
the number of young people who are “starting right”, meaning they are moving from school into 
“decent” employment that makes the most of their productive potential without significant difficulty 
and, conversely, those who face a “difficult” transition? Second, are there lessons to be learned in 
characterizing factors that influence the length and the difficulty of the transition? The ILO school-to-
work transition survey (SWTS) was developed as a tool to quantify, according to a systematic schema, 
the relative ease or difficulty of labour market entry of young people as they exit school. By starting 
from the premise that a person has not “transited” until they are settled in a job that meets a very basic 
criteria of “decency”, namely a permanency that can provide the worker with a sense of security (e.g. a 
permanent contract), or a job that the worker feels personally satisfied with, the ILO is introducing a 
new quality element to the standard definition of school-to-work transition.55  
The analytical framework associated with the SWTS allows us to first assess the 
characteristics of youth who are still in school, employed or self-employed, unemployed or outside of 
the labour force for reasons other than full-time studying. Then we use survey results to estimate: 1) 
the number of young people who have completed their transition into “decent work”; 2) those who are 
still in transition – that is, either unemployed or employed in a job that is temporary or unsatisfactory; 
and 3) the number of young people who have not yet transited either because they remain in school or 
are outside of the labour market with no plans to work in the future. For the youth who have 
completed their transition, we can analyze the relative ease or difficulty of their transition (easy, 
middling or difficult) based on their experience before entering their current job: for example, was it a 
direct transition or did they undergo numerous spells of unemployment and temporary employment; if 
the latter, how many and how long?  
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 ILO, 2003, p. 22.  
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 There is a wealth of literature on the nature of the school-to-work transition, but the transition period is generally defined in 
simple terms as the time period after which a person finishes school and begins his/her first post-graduation job. An excellent 
example is the recent work from Guarcello, et al, 2005.  
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The presentation and dissemination of the information should feed directly into policy making 
relating to youth employment and development at the national level. At the regional level, the surveys 
should provide examples and stimuli for other countries to engage in similar approaches to exploring 
the variables that explain the outcome of youth employment and using results as input in the policy-
making process.  
5.3  Some preliminary results  
With survey results56 now available from Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (henceforth, “Iran”), Jordan, the United Nations Administered Province of Kosovo (henceforth, 
“Kosovo”), Nepal and the Syrian Arab Republic (henceforth, “Syria”),57 we have a good basis for 
already highlighting some key findings and identifying common themes. (See table 5.1 for information 
relating to the survey size, coverage and reference period for the SWTS in each country.) The rest of 
this section serves as an example of the type of analysis that can be made based on the survey results.58 
However, due to the vast differences among the countries surveyed in terms of geographic size, level 
of development, etc., we do not attempt here to draw any conclusions based on a comparative analysis 
of survey results. 
Table 5.1 
Sampling size, reference period and survey coverage 
 Sample size 
(young people 
aged 15-29 
years*) 
Reference period Geographic coverage 
Azerbaijan 3,008 August 2005 national 
China 6,676 January to March 2005 4 urban areas – Dalian, Changsha, Liuzhou and Tianjin 
Egypt 5,423 September to October 2005 national 
Iran 3,245 September to October 2005 3 provinces – East Azarbayejan, Lorestan and Tehran 
Jordan 1,739 June to July 2004 3 regions – Amman, Irbid and Karak 
Kosovo 1,352 September to October 2004 
5 (of 7) regions – Pristina, Mitrovica, Gijlan, Gjakova, 
Prizren 
Nepal 2,400 September to October 2005 
5 districts – Banke, Bhaktapur, Kathmandu, Lalitpur 
and Morang 
Syria 2,000 November 2005 4 provinces  – Aleppo, Damascus, Hamah and Tartus 
* The surveys in Jordan and Kosovo covered the youth population aged 15-24 years. 
 
I. Economic activity status of young men and women 
In China, youth move quickly into employment, but in the other countries, youth are more likely to stay 
in school (see figure 5.1). 
China differs from the other countries surveyed in the high share of employed youth in the 
surveyed population (71.1 per cent). Among other countries, the largest share of young males 
surveyed were employed in Egypt (44.3 per cent) and Syria (46.6 per cent), while the largest share of 
young males still in school and therefore not yet started their transition was in Nepal (52.7 per cent).  
Young women are mainly inactive (and not in education). 
Inactivity was the most likely outcome of young women in Azerbaijan (36.8 per cent), Egypt 
(60.4 per cent), Nepal (43.0 per cent) and Syria (57.5 per cent), reflecting the large number of young 
women who stay at home rather than attend education or work. This is either the result of economic 
recession that makes the opportunity cost of leaving the housework, childcare, etc. to seek work in a 
                                                 
56
 Final reports for all of the country surveys mentioned above will be made available by the end of 2006. See website 
www.ilo.org/youth for more information. A more detailed “synthesis” of survey results will also be prepared and expected 
for publication in early 2007. 
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 A previous generation of ILO school-to-work transition surveys, prior to the current refinement of the questionnaire and 
the analytical framework, were run in conjunction with the ILO Gender Promotion Programme in previous years. Final 
Reports are available at the following links: www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/download/wp14.pdf (Indonesia), 
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/action/vietnam.htm (Viet Nam), and 
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/esp19.pdf (Sri Lanka). 
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 More in-depth analyses will be available in the forthcoming reports. 
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very tight job market too high (Azerbaijan and Nepal) and/or because the economic participation of 
women is not a widely accepted part of the culture (Egypt and Syria).  
In Kosovo the largest share of youth surveyed was unemployed; in Syria, unemployed was the 
principal activity status of young men. 
In Kosovo, the share of youth who were unemployed is troubling for both sexes (38.3 percent, 
young men; 29.4 percent, young women), while in Syria it was only young men who showed a 
disturbing likelihood of being unemployed (20.4 per cent). 
Figure 5.1 
Distribution of youth by current activity status, by sex 
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Sources of data in this table and those that follow are the ILO school-to-work transition surveys: draft reports and raw data. Final 
survey reports will be available soon. Some methodological information on each country survey is included in table 5.1. 
II. Judging the quality of the transition 
Many youth work without the protection of employment contracts in China (38.0 per cent), Egypt (69.1 
per cent) and Kosovo (19.2 per cent) (see table 5.2). 
A young person working without a contract runs the risk of easily losing the job or being 
exploited, both of which should be avoided when aiming for a “decent” transition. 
Table 5.2 
Distribution of employed youth by type of employment contract 
 
No contract 
(%) 
Temporary 
contract of less 
than 1 year (%) 
Fixed term 
contract of 1-3 
years (%) 
Unlimited 
contract (no 
term limit) (%) 
China 38.0 20.0 36.0 4.0 
Egypt 69.1 3.4 7.6 19.9 
Kosovo  19.2 9.3 31.4 37.0 
School-to-work transitions are lengthy and multi-stepped processes and few youths have “finished” by 
the age of 2959 (see figure 5.2). 
There are various ways of interpreting the results shown in the following figure. First, taken 
together with the results of the distribution of the population by current status, it is interesting to note 
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 The school-to-work transition surveys cover the age group 15 to 29 years, with the exceptions of Jordan and Kosovo, 
which used the standard age group 15 to 24 years.  
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that although 71 per cent of the young Chinese surveyed were working, only 17 per cent of the sample 
could be said to be in a “decent” job that they were completely satisfied with and would not wish to 
change in the future (i.e. had finished their transition). Second, comparing the shares by transition 
stage within countries, we find that, with the exception of Iranian males, in general less than one-fifth 
of youth in all surveyed countries had finished the transition. The rest had either not yet started their 
transition because they were still studying, were inactive with no future prospect of seeking work, 
were in less than satisfactory situations such as temporary work or in work that did not suit them, or 
were still looking for work.  
Figure 5.2 
Distribution of youth by stage of transition 
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Note: Youth who have “transited” include those who are working either in a job with a permanent contract or in a job that they 
are satisfied with and do not wish to change. Youth “in transition” include young people who are either unemployed or employed 
in a job that is temporary or unsatisfactory. “Transition not started” includes young people who have not yet started the transition 
into the labour market either because they remain in school or are outside of the labour market with no plans to work in the 
future. 
Youth in transition by in-transition activity status differ across countries. 
Most of the youth in transition were in temporary or non-career jobs60 in China, Jordan and 
Syria, while in Egypt and Iran the in-transition youth were more likely to be unemployed. Only in 
Nepal was the largest share (49.4 per cent) of youth inactive but with plans to take up future work 
(most likely biding their times until economic conditions improve) (see table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 
Distribution of youth in transition, by current activity status 
 
Employed in 
temporary or non-
career job (%) 
Unemployed 
(%) 
Inactive with intent to 
take up future work 
(%) 
China 64.0 28.0 8.0 
Egypt 32.4 38.7 29.0 
Iran 6.9 55.3 37.8 
Jordan  46.4 35.3 18.3 
Nepal  22.5 28.2 49.4 
Syria 53.0 39.5 7.4 
                                                 
60
 A “non-career job” is defined as one that the young worker (a) defines as unsatisfactory regardless of the reason and (b) 
expresses a desire to change.  
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Bad health and disability play a major role for inactivity in Kosovo. 
Reasons for inactivity (beyond education) show a surprising share of young men and women 
in Kosovo who were inactive due to bad health or disability. Household responsibilities remain the 
main barrier to young female labour force participation, but discouragement also rates high as a reason 
for both young men and women (see table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 
Distribution of youth outside of the labour force by reason for inactivity, by sex 
  
Bad 
health/disability (%) 
Housework and/or 
childcare 
responsibilities (%) 
Family does not 
give permission 
to work (%) 
Discouraged (%) Other (%) 
  Males  Females Males  Females Males  Females Males  Females Males  Females 
China 39.0 21.0 6.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 19.0 22.0 10.0 
Kosovo  66.1 32.3 0.0 27.3 0.0 2.6 22.2 21.3 11.7 16.5 
Syria 28.8 2.9 19.3 43.7 13.5 33.3 19.2 10.1 19.2 10.0 
Large shares of youth identified the lack of available job vacancies as their main obstacle to finding 
work (see table 5.5). 
It is interesting to view what in-transit youth identified as their main obstacle to finding work 
or finding their preferred work since the responses reflect the mindset of the young person at the time. 
In Egypt, Jordan and Kosovo, a clear majority (70.2, 65.4 and 54.5 per cent, respectively) saw an 
insufficient number of job vacancies as their main obstacle. Youth who blame such an “external” 
cause (meaning outside of their control) are more likely to feel angry about their situation and might 
act on their anger.  
Table 5.5 
Main obstacles to finding decent work identified by in-transit youth 
 Not enough jobs 
available (%) 
Insufficient level of 
education (%) 
Lack of experience 
(%) 
Other (%) 
Egypt 70.2 15.8 2.6 11.4 
Iran 35.8 14.0 20.3 29.9 
Jordan 65.4 2.7 11.7 20.2 
Kosovo 54.5 22.8 12.4 10.3 
Nepal 8.7 52.2 8.0 31.1 
Syria 16.2 42.9 15.7 25.2 
A higher education level does not guarantee an easier transition.  
Looking at the distribution of transition stage by education level, in Egypt and Nepal it is the 
youth with low levels of education (no education through secondary level) who are more likely to have 
completed their school-to-work transition than to remain in transition. (See figure 5.3.) At the higher 
education level, only 16 per cent of tertiary degree holders had transited compared to 26 per cent who 
were still in transition in Egypt. A look at the distribution of education levels of youth who have 
completed their transition reveals similar results: a youth who had completed the school-to-work 
transition was more likely to have only secondary level education in Iran and Nepal and only primary 
level education in Syria (see table 5.6). The results are likely to reflect higher demand in these 
countries for manual/production labour requiring less education compared to higher-skilled, 
professional work, typically in services. In many developing countries, the demand for highly 
educated labour is not keeping pace with the supply.  
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Figure 5.3 
Distribution of educational level of respondents by stage of transition, Egypt and Nepal 
17
33
22 16 16 18 18 10 11
22
15
22
24
26
35
55
64
38
17
17
68
45
54 58
48
27
18
52
72
61
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
No
sc
ho
ol
in
g
Pr
im
ar
y
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Te
rti
ar
y
Vo
ca
tio
n
al
 
No
sc
ho
ol
in
g
Pr
im
ar
y
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Te
rti
ar
y
Vo
ca
tio
n
al
 
Egypt Nepal
Not yet started
transition
In transition
Transited
 
Table 5.6 
Transited youth by education level 
 
No schooling 
(%) 
Primary 
(%) 
Secondary 
(%) 
Tertiary 
(%) 
Vocational  
(%) 
China 0.0 2.0 16.0 53.0 29.0 
Iran 0.0 37.8 46.4 15.0 n.a. 
Nepal  14.0 12.6 55.2 16.4 1.7 
Syria 9.5 41.3 37.2 11.9 n.a. 
n.a. = Not available 
III. Is there a mismatch between supply and demand? 
For skilled professional jobs, educational levels play a role for employers, but work experience is 
more important. 
Employers ranked the education level of the young job applicant for skilled professional 
positions as the most important factor influencing their hiring decisions in only two of the five 
countries with data (Jordan and Nepal). Employers in China and Kosovo rated work experience as the 
most important, while in Syria, employment decisions continue to be very much biased by the sex of 
the applicant (see table 5.7). In the countries studied there is likely to be more supply than demand for 
youth with higher education degrees, which leads to a situation in which employers push up the 
educational requirements of even basic skill positions. The result is high levels of skills-based 
underemployment (where employees are over-qualified for the work they do). Educational 
qualifications are much more important in applicants for professional posts; 76 per cent of employers 
in Egypt and 73 per cent of employers in Nepal expected applicants to have a university education or 
higher (see table 5.8). 
Work experience is most important for manual/production workers. 
For manual/production posts, the most important factor influencing the hiring decisions of 
employers was the work experience of the applicant, followed by their previous training (see table 
5.7). The education level sought by employers of young manual/production workers is rarely more 
than completion of the secondary level, when any preferences exist (see table 5.8).  
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Table 5.7 
Most important factors influencing employers’ decisions when hiring young men and women, 
by type of post (professional/administrative or manual/production) 
China Jordan Kosovo Nepal Syria 
Quality Profes-
sional 
Manual Profes-
sional 
Manual Profes-
sional 
Manual Profes-
sional 
Manual Profes-
sional 
Manual 
Sex 0.0 0.0 15.4 4.3 4.0 5.2 0.0 2.5 32.9 13.9 
Age 0.5 5.4 3.6 4.3 6.4 14.0 2.5 14.2 9.1 19.6 
Education 41.2 1.5 30.3 4.6 30.8 6.0 45.8 4.2 25.9 9.5 
Marital status 0.5 4.9 1.7 1.1 2.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.3 
Previous training 4.3 27.8 8.3 15.8 20.4 9.2 4.2 4.2 10.5 17.7 
Work experience 42.6 41.5 26.3 48.4 36.4 61.2 45.8 69.2 17.5 36.1 
Other 10.9 18.9 14.4 21.5 0.0 0.0 1.7 5.9 3.5 1.9 
 
Table 5.8 
Employers’ preferences of education level when hiring young men and women, by type of post 
(professional/administrative or manual/production) 
Egypt Kosovo Nepal Syria 
Education level Profes-
sional 
Manual Profes-
sional 
Manual Profes-
sional 
Manual Profes-
sional 
Manual 
Primary education 0.5 7.6 0.4 8.8 0.0 4.2 31.3 61.2 
Technical/vocational training 2.9 22.6 45.4 69.7 10 2.5 n.a n.a 
Secondary 13.2 20.3 20.7 20.3 17.5 28.3 28.4 19.7 
University education or higher 76.1 3.3 33.5 1.2 72.5 5.8 39.5 9.2 
No education preference 7.3 46.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 59.2 0.7 9.9 
n.a. = Not available 
Survey results do not support the claim that the reason employers do not hire young people is because 
they lack the basic skills required.  
The general assessment by employers of the skill levels of young job applicants and young 
workers revealed an overall satisfaction with the level of skills shown by young men and women (see 
figure 5.4).  
Figure 5.4 
Employers’ general skills assessment of young job applicants and young workers, by type of 
skill and overall general preparedness 
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5.4 Summary 
SWTSs are an essential tool for gaining a better understanding of the problems of labour 
market entrants. The survey can serve as a tool allowing countries to capture both quantitative and 
qualitative variables such as young people’s education and training experience, their perceptions and 
aspirations in terms of employment, their life goals and values, the job search process, the family’s 
influence on the choice of occupation, barriers to and supports for entry into the labour market, the 
preference for wage employment or self-employment or for public or private sector employment, 
attitudes of employers towards hiring young workers, current employment/working conditions, control 
over resources, job satisfaction, marriage and family responsibilities and gender differentials. The 
survey focuses on the transition and the variables behind the relative ease or difficulty of the transition 
in order to gauge where and how countries can proceed towards improving the process of matching the 
supply and demand for young labour. The objective of the surveys is to arm policy makers, employers’ 
organizations, trade unions and youth themselves with timely information on specific youth labour 
market challenges so that appropriate policies and programmes can be designed in response to 
measurable needs.  
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Annex 1. Key regional labour market indicators for youth and 
issues for consideration 
 
The following tables present the most current labour market indicators for youth and offer a 
general assessment of the most pressing issues in each region.61 These tables can be used as a starting 
point for policy makers and international agencies as indication of the true challenges that need to be 
focused on regarding young people. The variations of indicator results and issues for consideration 
presented in each regional table are a reminder that it is better to discuss youth labour market trends on 
the regional level rather than the global level.  
 
Developed Economies and European Union 
Current labour market indicators 
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 51.8% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 45.0 
• Youth unemployment rate: 13.1% 
• One in 4 of the total employed are young 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 2.3 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 3.7% 
• Highest share of employment in Services (71%); share of 
employment in Agriculture, 4% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force 
participation rates: -4.4 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates:    
-1.0 percentage point 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 15.7% 
• Children and youth cohort is shrinking; less than a third of 
the population under the age of 25 by 2025 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 2.4 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels: 
high 
Some issues for consideration 
• Job quality – equal pay for work of equal value, contracts, hours of work 
• Balancing flexibility with security  
• Gender wage gaps 
• Declining employment content of growth 
 
Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 
Current labour market indicators 
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 41.8% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 33.5 
• Youth unemployment rate: 19.9% 
• One in 3 of the total unemployed are young 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 2.6 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 10.2% 
• Highest share of employment in Services (50%), share of 
employment in Agriculture, 23% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force 
participation rates: -13.4 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates: -
0.8 percentage point 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 22.1% 
• Children and youth cohort is shrinking; only a third of the 
population under the age of 25 by 2025 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 6.5 
• Youth US$1 a day working poverty rate: 2.9% 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels: 
medium to weak 
Some issues for consideration 
• High numbers of youth who are neither in education nor in employment 
• Invisible underemployment based on skills mismatch, namely youth taking jobs that do not make use of their skills 
(example: the trained lawyer driving a taxi) 
                                                 
61
 Unless otherwise stated data are for 2005. It is important to bear in mind when reviewing this table that the regional 
assessments mask a great deal of regional variation and readers should be wary of assuming a particularly country “fits” 
perfectly all of the characterizations defined. For example, the overall youth unemployment rate of South Asia is relatively 
low at 10 per cent; however, this masks the wide variation between countries, where India, for example, had a youth 
unemployment rate of 10.5 per cent in 2004, while the rate was 28.9 per cent in Sri Lanka. The issues for consideration 
identified are general and are not meant to be all-inclusive. 
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• Managing external migration – brain drain 
• Encouraging investment and job creation 
• Balancing flexibility with security 
• Childcare facilities necessary to allow women to work 
 
East Asia 
Current labour market indicators 
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 67.3% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 62.1 
• Youth unemployment rate: 7.8% 
• Two in 5 of the total unemployed are young 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 2.8 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 31.5% 
• Highest share of employment in Agriculture (58%), share of 
employment in Services, 19% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force 
participation rates: 2.1 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates:   
-2.8 percentage point 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 20.9% 
• Children and youth cohort is shrinking; only a third of the 
population under the age of 25 by 2025 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 8.5 
• Youth US$1 a day working poverty rate: 13.4% 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels: 
high 
Some issues for consideration 
• Job quality – social protection, social dialogue, hours of work 
• Inequity in rural and urban development 
• Improving the school-to-work transition 
• Managing external and internal (rural to urban) migration 
• Job security in small and medium enterprises 
 
South East Asia and the Pacific 
Current labour market indicators 
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 56.5% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 47.5 
• Youth unemployment rate: 15.8% 
• Three in 5 of the total unemployed are young 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 5.1 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 4.0% 
• Highest share of employment in Agriculture (44%), share of 
employment in Services, 35% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force 
participation rates: -15.7 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates: 
0.5 percentage point 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 27.5% 
• Youthful population; by 2025, 42% of the population will 
still be under the age of 25 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 5.2 
• Youth US$1 a day working poverty rate: 12.8% 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels: 
medium to low 
Some issues for consideration 
• Youthful population adds pressure for job growth to accommodate labour market entrants  
• Severe disadvantages in finding work compared to adults 
• Invisible underemployment base on skills mismatch, namely youth taking jobs that do not make use of their skills (example: 
the trained lawyer driving a taxi) 
• Improving education enrolment rates 
• Improving job quality in the agricultural sector and development within the rural non-farm sector 
• Encouraging investment and job creation 
• Managing external and internal (rural to urban) migration 
• Youth reluctant to enter the private sector 
• Formal sector growth 
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South Asia 
Current labour market indicators 
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 47.2% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 42.5 
• Youth unemployment rate: 10.0% 
• One in 2 of the total unemployed are youth 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 2.8 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 6.8% 
• Highest share of employment in Agriculture (62%), share of 
employment in Services, 24% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force 
participation rates: -35.1 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates: 
0.7 percentage point 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 29.3% 
• Very youthful population; by 2025, almost half of the 
population (47%) will still be under the age of 25 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 6.0 
• Youth US$1 a day working poverty rate: 37% 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels: 
medium to low 
Some issues for consideration 
• Graduate unemployment 
• Invisible underemployment based on skills mismatch, namely youth taking jobs that do not make use of their skills 
(example: the trained lawyer driving a taxi) 
• Barriers to labour market entry high for young women 
• Youthful population adds pressure for job growth to accommodate labour market entrants 
• Improving job quality in the agricultural sector and development within the rural non-farm sector 
• Managing external and internal (rural to urban) migration 
• Encouraging investment and job creation 
• Youth reluctant to enter the private sector 
• High poverty 
• Formal sector growth 
• Civil conflicts 
• Improving education enrolment rates 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Current labour market indicators  
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 54.2% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 45.2 
• Youth unemployment rate: 16.6% 
• One in 2 of the total unemployed are young 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 2.8 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 5.0% 
• Highest share of employment in Services (62%); share of 
employment in Agriculture, 18% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force 
participation rates: -19.3 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates: 
8.4 percentage point 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 26.9% 
• Youthful population; by 2025, 39% of the population will 
still be under the age of 25 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 2.8 
• Youth US$1 a day working poverty rate: 13.3% 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels: 
medium 
Some issues for consideration 
• Barriers to labour market entry high for young women 
• Improving education enrolment rates and education system 
• Youthful population adds pressure for job growth to accommodate labour market entrants 
• Encouraging investment and job creation 
• Formal sector growth 
• Improving education enrolment rates 
• Job quality 
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Middle East and North Africa 
Current labour market indicators  
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 40.0% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 29.7 
• Youth unemployment rate: 25.7% 
• One in 2 of the total unemployed are young 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 3.1 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 0.1% 
• Highest share of emp in Services (47%); share of emp in 
Agriculture, 26% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force 
participation rates: -29.2 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates: 
8.0 percentage point 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 32.6% 
• Youthful population; by 2025, 45% of the population will 
still be under the age of 25 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 4.7 
• Youth US$1 a day working poverty rate: 3.4% 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels: 
medium to high 
Some issues for consideration 
• Barriers to labour market entry high for young women 
• Graduate unemployment 
• Job quality 
• Managing external and internal migration 
• Youth reluctant to join the private sector 
• Investment and job creation 
• Youthful population adds pressure for job growth to accommodate labour market entrants 
• Informal job search / hiring networks 
• Civil conflicts 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Current labour market indicators 
Labour market indicators 
• Youth labour force participation rate: 65.5% 
• Youth employment-to-population ratio: 53.7 
• Youth unemployment rate: 18.1% 
• Three in 5 of the total unemployed are young 
• Ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate: 3.0 
• Change in youth inactivity rate 1995-2005: 8.3% 
• Highest share of employment in Agriculture (65%), share of 
employment in Services, 27% 
• Gap between female and male youth labour force participation 
rates: -16.4 percentage points 
• Gap between female and male youth unemployment rates: 2.5 
percentage points 
Demographics 
• Share of youth in working-age pop: 36.9% 
• Very youthful population; by 2025, almost 3 in 5 (58%) 
of the population will still be under the age of 25 
Other 
• Average GDP growth rate 2000-05: 4.3 
• Youth US$1 a day working poverty rate: 57.7% 
• Educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary 
levels: low 
Some issues for consideration 
• Invisible underemployment based on skills mismatch likely to be very high as well, namely youth taking jobs that do not 
make use of their skills (example: the trained lawyer driving a taxi) 
• High poverty 
• Youthful population adds pressure for job growth to accommodate labour market entrants 
• Civil conflicts, child soldiers 
• Improving education enrolment rates and education system 
• Nutrition and disease, including HIV-AIDS 
• Improving job quality in the agricultural sector and development within the rural non-farm sector 
• Encouraging investment and job creation 
• Managing external and internal (rural to urban) migration 
• Youth reluctant to enter the private sector 
• Formal sector growth 
• Improving infrastructure 
 Annex 2. Global employment trends – regional groupings 
 
Developed 
Economies and 
European Union 
European Union 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
North America 
Canada 
United States 
Other Developed 
Economies 
Australia 
Gibraltar 
Greenland 
Isle of Man 
Israel 
Japan 
New Zealand 
San Marino 
St. Pierre and  
   Miquelon 
Western Europe (non-
EU) 
Andora 
Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
Monaco 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Central and Eastern 
Europe (non-EU) and 
CIS 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Albania 
Bosnia and  
   Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Romania 
The former Yugoslav  
   Republic of  
   Macedonia 
Serbia and  
   Montenegro 
Turkey 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Republic of Moldova 
Russian Federation 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
East Asia 
China 
Hong Kong, China 
Korea, Democratic 
   People’s Republic of  
Korea, Republic of 
Macau, China 
Mongolia 
Taiwan, China 
South East Asia and 
the Pacific 
South East Asia 
Brunei Darussalam 
Cambodia 
East Timor 
Indonesia 
Lao People’s 
Democratic  
   Republic 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
Pacific Islands 
American Samoa 
Cook Islands 
Fiji 
French Polynesia 
Guam 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Nauru 
New Caledonia 
Niue 
Papua New Guinea 
Northern Mariana    
   Islands 
Samoa 
Solomon Islands 
Tokelau 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Wallis and Futuna Islands 
South Asia 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Caribbean 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Grenada 
Guadeloupe 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Martinique 
Montserrat 
Netherlands Antilles 
Puerto Rico 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the  
   Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turks and Caicos  
   Islands 
United States Virgin  
   Islands 
Central America 
Belize 
Costa Rica 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
South America 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Falkland Islands  
   (Malvinas) 
French Guiana 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Réunion 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Tanzania, United  
   Republic of 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zanzibar 
Zimbabwe 
Middle Africa 
Angola 
Cameroon 
Central African 
   Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
Congo, Democratic  
   Republic of 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon 
Sao Tome and  
   Principe 
Southern Africa 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Western Africa 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
St. Helena 
Togo 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Middle East 
Bahrain 
Djibouti 
Iran, Islamic Republic  
   of 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Somalia 
Syrian Arab Republic 
United Arab Emirates 
West Bank and Gaza  
   Strip 
Yemen 
North Africa 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Libyan Arab  
   Jamahiriya 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
48
 
49 
Annex 3. Glossary of labour market terms 
 
 
Labour market statistics and the indicators generated from the statistics can cause a great deal of confusion and, 
therefore, misinterpretation among users. The following glossary of labour market concepts should serve to 
clarify much of the terminology used in this report: 
 
Currently active population:  the best known measure of the economically active population, also known as the 
“labour force” (see definition below).  
 
Discouraged worker: a person who is without work and available for work but did not seek work (and therefore 
could not be classified as “unemployed”) because s/he felt that no work would be available to her/him. 
According to the standard classification system, the discouraged worker is counted among the inactive, although 
many analysts would like to see the number of discouraged workers added to the unemployed to give a broader 
measure of the unutilized supply of labour. “Discouraged” implies a sense of “giving up”, meaning the 
discouraged worker has simply given up any hope of finding work for reasons such as s/he feels s/he lacks the 
proper qualifications, s/he does not know where or how to look for work, or s/he feels that no suitable work is 
available. The discouraged worker, therefore, could be said to be “involuntarily” inactive.  
 
Economically active population: all persons who supplied labour for the production of goods and services in a 
specified reference period; in other words, all persons who undertook economic activity (also known as “market 
activities”), as defined by the 1993 UN System of National Accounts (SNA),1 during the measured time frame.  
 
Employed: a person who performed some work – for at least one hour during the specified reference period – 
for wage or salary (paid employment) or for profit or family gain (self-employment). A person is also considered 
employed if s/he has a job but was temporarily not at work during the reference period.  
 
Employment: a measure of the total number of employed persons. 
 
Employment-to-population ratio: the number of employed persons as a percentage of the working-age 
population. This indicator measures the proportion of the population who could be working (the working-age 
population) who are working, and as such provides some information on the efficacy of the economy to create 
jobs.  
 
Inactive: a person who is neither employed nor unemployed, or, equivalently, is not in the labour force.  
 
Inactivity rate: the sum of all inactive persons as a percentage of the working-age population. As an inverse to 
the labour force participation rate, the inactivity rate serves as a measure of the relative size of the population 
who do not supply labour for the production of goods and services. 
 
Job: a paid position of regular employment. According to the standard definition, therefore, only the wage and 
salaried workers could have a “job”. Common usage, however, has extended the concept to encompass any 
work-related task, which means that any employed person, whether a paid employee or self-employed, could 
qualify as “with a job”.  
 
Labour force:2  the sum of all persons above a specified age (the nationally defined “working age”) who were 
either employed or unemployed over a specified short reference period; the labour force is the best known 
measure of the economically active population, and is also known as the “currently active population”. The 
labour force (employment + unemployment) + the economically inactive population = total working-age 
population of a country. 
 
Labour force participation rate: the sum of persons in the labour force as a percentage of the working-age 
population. The indicator serves as a measure of the relative size of the labour supply available for the 
production of goods and services.  
 
Labour market: the virtual (non-tangible) arena where workers compete for jobs and employers compete for 
workers. Analysts use labour market information, including statistics such as the employment-to-population 
ratio, the unemployment rate, etc., to make assessments of how well the labour market functions and how and/or 
why the supply of labour and the demand for labour do not meet at perfect equilibrium.  
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Unemployed: a person who, during the specified short reference period, was (a) without work, (b) currently 
available for work, and (c) seeking work. A person is also considered unemployed if s/he is not currently 
working but has made arrangements to take up paid or self-employment at a date subsequent to the reference 
period.  
 
Unemployment: a measure of the total number of unemployed persons. 
 
Unemployment rate: unemployment as a percentage of the total labour force (employment + unemployment). 
The indicator is widely used as a measure of unutilized labour supply.  
 
Work: as a verb, a general term meaning to engage in “economic activity”, or, equivalently, to supply labour as 
input in the production of goods and services; as a noun, “work” has come to be used interchangeably with “job” 
and “employment” – for example, a person who supplies labour might say s/he “has work” or “has a job” or even 
“has employment”.  
 
Working: an informal synonym for “employed”.  
 
1
 See website http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/introduction.asp for additional information on the SNA and the 
guidelines for determining economic activity.  
2
 The international standard that serves to guide statisticians in the definition of the economically active 
population and its categories is the Resolution concerning statistics of the economically active population, 
employment, unemployment and underemployment, adopted by the 13th International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians, October 1982; www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/res/ecacpop.pdf. 
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